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Abstract
The BGP-4 protocol controls the routing information exchange between the independent
networks or Autonomous Systems that form the Internet. It is also the main tool for
controlling the traffic exchange between them. To control this traffic, routing policies are
used. At the same time, the use of routing policies makes BGP-4 become metastable,
making it possible for the protocol to oscillate or to produce unexpected results.
In this work, I study the general evolution of the routing tables in the core of the
Internet and instances of unstable behaviour of BGP-4. In this study, I conclude that the
routing table in the core of the Internet can be reduced by a third of its entries. These
entries are used for local configurations traffic control between leaf networks and their
providers and have little or no impact on how remote networks route traffic towards
these leaf networks.
As a result, I propose PaRArch, a routing architecture that uses BGP-4 and separates
the local routing policies between leaf networks and their providers from the routing
information that is going to be used in the core of the Internet in two different and
isolated routing planes. Using a proof of concept implementation on a virtualised network
emulation environment, I show that local routes do not leak to the main routing table
and that control over traffic is much tighter than by using state-of-the-art BGP-4 traffic
engineering techniques.
One of the main benefits of PaRArch is that it allows the routing plane of the core
network of the Internet to be controlled by an instance of BGP-4 that works without
policies. This eliminates metastability from this BGP-4 instance and renders a stable
and predictable core network for the Internet.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Internet besteht aus einzelnen, für sich selbst agierenden und entscheidenden Teil-
netzen, den sogenannten autonomen Systemen. Um Daten zwischen diesen autonomen
Systemen auszutauschen, müssen Information zur Wegewahl (Routinginformationen)
zwischen ihnen ausgetauscht werden. Diesen Austausch kontrolliert heute das so ge-
nannte Border Gateway Protokoll in Version 4 (BGP-4). Es ist damit das wichtigste
Werkzeug, um den Datenverkehr zwischen den autonomen Systemen zu kontrollieren.
Diese Kontrolle wird an Hand von Richtlinien, den sogenannten „Routing Policies” im-
plementiert. Gleichzeitig sind diese „Routing Policies” dafür verantwortlich, dass BGP-4
metastabil wird und es zu Schwingungen im Netz kommen kann. Diese Schwingungen
beeinträchtigen den normalen Datenfluss und können zu unvorhergesehene Pfade für den
Datenaustausch im Netz führen.
In dieser Arbeit studiere ich wie sich die Anzahl der Einträge in den Routingtabellen
im Internet zwischen 2000 und 2010 entwickelt hat. Ich zeige, dass sich die Routingta-
bellen des Internets ungefähr um ein Drittel der Einträge reduzieren lassen, weil es sich
bei diesem Drittel um Einträge handelt, die sich auf lokale Konfigurationen zwischen
autonomen Systemen am Rand des Internets und deren Providern zurückführen lassen.
Diese Einträge haben wenig oder gar kein Einfluss auf den Datenstrom in Netzen, die
topologisch entfernt von den Netzen, die sie generierten, im Internet liegen. Außerdem
analysiere ich Vorfälle, wo BGP-4 unstabil wurde.
Diese Beobachtungen führen mich dazu, eine neue Routingarchitektur für das In-
ternet, PaRArch, vorzuschlagen. Diese Architektur basiert auf BGP-4, entkoppelt aber
den Austausch von Routinginformation zwischen autonomen Systemen am Rand des
Internets und deren Dienstleistern vom restlichen Internet. Dazu werden zwei isolier-
te Datenaustauschebenen definiert. Die eine führt Routinginformationen, die nur lokal
signifikant sind, während die andere die Routingdaten führt, die allgemein im Inter-
net gebraucht werden. An Hand einer Implementation auf einem Netzemulator, zeige
ich dass die lokale Routinginformation tatsächlich nicht in die allgemeine Routingebene
weitergereicht wird und dass eine Kontrolle des Datenflusses wie bei anderen gängigen
BGP-4 Konfigurationen möglich ist.
Einer der wichtigsten Vorteile von PaRArch ist, dass die allgemeine Routingebene
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des Internets mit einer BGP-4 Instanz kontrolliert wird, die nicht von „Routing Policies”
Gebrauch macht. Dadurch wird das zentrale Netz des Internet stabil und vorhersagbar,
da die Ursache für die Metastabilität von BGP-4 verschwindet.
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Chapter1
Introduction
The Internet is a network of networks. It is the result of interconnecting different data
packet networks that use the Internet Protocol (IP) as defined in RFC 791 [1]. Informa-
tion flow in data packet networks is controlled by two functions: switching and routing.
Switching implements transmitting an incoming data packet on an outgoing interface
and is implemented locally at each node. Routing is a network-wide function to calcu-
late the paths that should be followed by data packets from a source to a destination.
Routers combine their knowledge about their topological neighbourhood in the network
with the information they receive from other routers, locally creating a global view of the
network that is used to calculate the network paths. This is a distributed process, which
involves all routers in a network. In order to transmit packets reliably in a network, the
routing process has to converge and yield stable configurations in all nodes. Routing
protocols can be influenced in the way they calculate the paths followed by data packets
by using routing policies.
Each of the networks which make up the Internet is known as an Autonomous System
(AS). ASes have clear boundaries and a central authority that defines which routing
protocols are used in the network and which routing policies are applied. ASes run
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4), defined in RFC 4271 [2], to exchange routing
information with other ASes. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) own and operate one
or more ASes. It is more coherent to use the term ISP when discussing commercial
relationships between networks in the Internet and to use the term Autonomous System
when discussing technical issues related with routing.
Autonomous Systems that are interconnected are said to be peering. These intercon-
nections are governed by economic rules that condition the technical implementation of
the peering agreement. There are basically two types of peering relationships between
Autonomous Systems: client-provider and peer-to-peer. In a client-provider relationship,
the AS acting as client will pay the AS acting as provider for the received traffic. Peer-
ing agreements between provider and client ASes stipulate the way the traffic volumes
are measured and the price for different traffic volumes. In a peer-to-peer relationship,
traffic is exchanged on a fair basis and in a balanced way between the ASes. Peering
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agreements for this kind of interconnections stipulate compensations when the fairness
principle is not respected by one of the parties. Another important economic factor for
Internet Service Providers are the costs for setting up the network infrastructure and
the costs for keeping the infrastructure functional.
The economic viability of ISPs has prompted the need to optimise both how the traffic
is routed internally in an AS and how the traffic is exchanged with other ASes. To achieve
traffic distributions that are (at least, approximately) optimal, Traffic Engineering (TE)
techniques are used. TE is implemented by modifying how routers calculate the next
hop for packets, i.e., their forwarding tables, implementing so-called routing policies in
the routers’ configurations.
In the present work I study inter-AS Traffic Engineering techniques. I use BGP-4
traffic traces that are being collected in a long-term effort by the European Regional
Internet Registry (RIR), Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE). These BGP-4 traffic traces
are stored in a routing repository that is a part of RIPE’s Routing Information Service
(RIPE RIS) project [3, 4]. I propose a method to identify TE techniques through their
fingerprints in BGP-4 traffic traces and use the results of this study to show weak points
in the Border Gateway Protocol. Finally, I propose modifications to it that yield a more
robust and scalable Internet routing architecture.
I take three different approaches: my first approach is to study BGP-4 traffic traces
from periods of time with no apparent dysfunctions in the Internet. For these periods
of time, I propose a two-stage method to detect TE activity. It involves filtering data
from the BGP-4 repositories to isolate update sequences with specific characteristics
and identifying the network prefixes affected by them. Then I study the statistical
distributions of the arrival times of BGP-4 updates containing these prefixes over a
longer period of time. My second approach takes advantage of a serious routing incident
in the summer of 2009 [5]. I study the intrinsic characteristics of the Border Gateway
Protocol protocol which led to it, how an earlier storm with similar root causes was dealt
with, and show how TE techniques did not only not help to control the routing storm,
but actually helped to spread it through the Internet. The third and last approach I
use in the present work is to study the evolution of the Internet’s routing table over the
last 10 years and concentrate on the prefixes which can be traced back to TE related
configurations.
My research shows the following:
1. Routing policies which can be traced back to Traffic Engineering techniques prop-
agate in the Internet core’s routing tables beyond the topological neighbourhood
where they are meant to control the traffic to places where they have no effect.
They manifest themselves as superfluous routing table entries.
2. Routing data generated by routing policies account for one third or approximately
100,000 routes of the Internet’s routing tables. These data are useless outside the
scope of the routing policies.
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3. The routing storms observed in 2009 were originated by session resets that were
forced as a response to malformed BGP-4 packets. When a malformed BGP-4
packet is sent, the peer resets the session and the malformed BGP-4 is sent again
and the session is reset again, and so on until the peering is shut down. During
this process, BGP-4 includes no root cause information to help trace and correct
the problem.
Additionally, I also observed that, in order to provide a quick remedy for a BGP-4
storm in January of 2009 [6], BGP-4 was made more tolerant to some types of
invalid BGP-4 data. This modification resulted in the leak of internal AS topology
data, which should normally not be accessible to the outside world.
I propose an alternative behaviour for BGP-4 that yields a more robust protocol
and, therefore, a more reliable Internet routing architecture. Concretely, I propose two
actions:
1. To use a parallel routing table mechanism to implement routing configurations
with specific purposes like implementing Service Level Agreements. Routing infor-
mation that is only needed in a specific peering is kept local using this mechanism.
2. To use parallel and independent BGP-4 sessions for each of the aforementioned
routing tables. The main routing table is handled by an instance of BGP-4 running
on the standard TCP port, while the rest of the routing tables use alternate sessions
using non-standard TCP ports. Any new feature is introduced in one of these
sessions. We thereby avoid malformed packets in the main routing table and
thereby, we reduce the possibility of routing storms in the Internet.
These alternatives have been implemented and tested with the Netkit network emula-
tion environment and the open source QUAGGA routing software and will be submitted
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for consideration.
The rest of this work is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces organisation of the Internet and describes the Border Gate-
way Protocol BGP-4.
• Chapter 3 introduces common practises used to implement Traffic Engineering in
the Internet.
• Chapter 4 discusses related work.
• Chapter 5 shows how the Autonomous System Path (AS_PATH) attribute is
being used as a TE tool in the Internet and how operations windows of ISPs can
be derived from the routing information stored in routing repositories.
• Chapter 6 discusses two routing storms that occurred during 2009 and that can
be traced back to the BGP-4 standardisation process.
• Chapter 7 shows how the impact of BGP-4-based TE on the evolution of the
Internet’s Default Free Zone.
• Chapter 8 presents my alternative routing architecture proposal. It helps creating
aggregated core routing tables and allows for the TE configurations that use current
common practises.
• Finally, Chapter 9 presents an outlook on future work.
3
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This work is based on the following publications:
• Detection of Trial and Error Traffic Engineering with BGP-4 [7], presented at the
Fifth International Conference on Networking and Services (ICNS 2009)
• On the use of Trial and Error Traffic Engineering techniques in the Internet [8]
published at the Sixth International Conference on Broadband Communications,
Networks and Systems (Broadnets 2009)
• Simple Statistical Analysis Method for the Behaviour of Autonomous Systems [9]
• Using RFC4893 violations to reveal the topology of AS Confederations [10], pre-
sented in The Sixth International Conference on Networking and Services (ICNS
2010)
• Revisiting the Impact of Traffic Engineering Techniques on the Internet’s Routing
Table [11], presented at the Second International Conference on Mobile Networks
and Management, (MonAMI’10)
• A Simplified Internet Routing Architecture: Removing Traffic Engineering and
Security Artifacts from the Internet’s Default Free Zone [12], a full paper developed
from the previous conference paper
• Flexible Routing with Maximum Aggregation in the Internet [13], published at the
Third International Conference on Mobile Networks and Management,
(MonAMI’11)
4
Chapter2
Routing in the Internet
Contents
2.1 The Administrative Organisation of the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Internet registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Autonomous System Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3 IP addresses and prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 The Routing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Source routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 BGP-4 protocol basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 The Route Decision Process in BGP-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
This chapter briefly describes the administrative organisation of the Internet, how
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are identified and how they are assigned addressing
space. Then, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) is discussed, including a description
of the Finite State Machine (FSM) that governs the protocol, the different update types
and the basics of the route decision process. Finally, the basic modules in a router are
presented along with the paths traversed by IP packets and BGP-4 updates in an IP
router.
2.1 The Administrative Organisation of the Internet
The Internet is the interconnection of different Internet Service Providers, who operate
one or more IP network infrastructures that are known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).
An AS, as defined in RFC 1930 [14], is “a connected group of one or more Internet
Protocol (IP) prefixes run by one or more network operators which has a single and
clearly defined routing policy”. In other words, an AS is a routing domain with well-
defined routing policies. BGP-4 is the inter-domain routing protocol of the Internet. It
5
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conveys the routing information from one routing domain to another. ASes are identified
by an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that, like the addressing space, is assigned
by the Internet registries.
2.1.1 Internet registries
The central authority for IP address and ASN management is the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA). The IANA has divided the globe into five regions, each of
which is managed by a so called Regional Internet Registry (RIR). Prefixes and ASNs
are assigned by the IANA to the different RIRs in blocks. Each RIR, in turn, assigns
prefixes and ASNs within its designated geographical area from their assigned block.
RFC 2050 [15] describes current best practises for IP address allocation. It has been
overridden in some RIRs like Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC) after
assignment of the last /8 prefix assignments on the 3rd of February, 2011 [16].
2.1.2 Autonomous System Numbers
Autonomous Systems are identified by their ASN for the purpose of BGP-4 routing. The
original forecast of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was that unsigned 16-bit
integers would suffice to accommodate the expected number of Autonomous Systems. It
reserved the range between 64512 and 65534 for private autonomous system identifiers
that, analogously to private IP addresses, are not to be announced to the Internet.
Furthermore, ASNs 0, 54272 to 64511 and 65535 were also reserved. The success of the
Internet has made this initial plan insufficient. By September 2008, only ASNs between
49152 and 54271 were free [17]. 32-bit Autonomous System Numbers as specified in
RFC 4893 [18] were introduced to cope with new requests for ASNs. These new 32-bit
ASNs are represented either as unsigned 32-bit integers or, for the sake of improved
readability, in the form x.y, where x and y are the most and least significant words of
the ASN represented as unsigned 16-bit integers. The original 16-bit ASNs predating
RFC 4893 are represented in the format 0.y. RFC 4893 reserves the Autonomous System
Numbers in the range {1.0, 1.65535} and 65535.65535. The remainder of the space is
available for allocation.
2.1.3 IP addresses and prefixes
IP addresses identify hosts in IP networks. Currently there are two versions of IP
deployed in the Internet: IPv4 and IPv6. IPv4 is the mature version and uses 32-bit
unsigned integers as network interface identifiers and IPv6 is the alternative version that
is progressively substituting IPv4 due to the depletion of the public IPv4 address space.
This process is in its final stage. The last /8 address blocks were handed over by IANA
to the RIRs on the 3rd of February, 2011. IPv6 uses 128-bit unsigned integers as host
identifiers. IPv4 and IPv6 are said to be two Address Families (AFs).
As with Autonomous System Numbers, the IETF has created blocks of private IP
addresses which can only be used in the scope of private networks and not be advertised
6
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to the Internet. RFC 1918 [19] initially defined the private address blocks for IPv4.
Another specific range for Auto-configuration was added in RFC 3927 [20]. Currently,
RFC 5735 [21] specifies all special purpose IPv4 address ranges. IP addresses not belong-
ing to any special category are called public IP addresses and can only be assigned to one
host at a given moment in time. IPv6 uses the same philosophy, but other terminology.
RFC 4193 [22] defines Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses, which are equivalent to
IPv4 private addresses.
IP addresses are assigned in blocks, known as prefixes. Prefixes are sets of contiguous
IP addresses that are designated by a base address (B) and a mask (BM). The mask
BM has its M most significant bits set to 1 and the rest set to 0. The most common
notation for a prefix is P = B/M . Throughout this work, the following definitions are
used in relation with operations on prefixes:
Definition 1 LAF is the bit length of the AF, i.e., LAF = 32 for IPv4 and LAF = 128
for IPv6.
Definition 2 Addresses and address masks can be assumed to be unsigned LAF -bit long
integers. If A is an address of Address Family AF , then
A ∈ {0, .., 2LAF − 1}
Definition 3 B/M represents a prefix P, where B is the base address and
M ∈ {0, .., LAF} is the prefix mask length.
Definition 4 The prefix mask BM has its M most significant bits set:
BM =∼ (2LAF−M − 1)
where ∼ is the bit-wise negation.
Definition 5 B/M represents a valid prefix P if and only if
B ∧BM = B
Definition 6 Prefix matching: Let P = B/M and A be an IP address of the same
AF as B.
A ∈ P ⇔ A ∧BM = B
Definition 7 Subnetting: Let P = B/M . The set of addresses contained in P can be
divided in two subsets, known as sub-networks P1,P2, which contain the same amount of
IP addresses. The sub-networks will have a mask of length M +1. They will be denoted
as P1 and P2 in the rest of this work, where
P1 = B/M + 1
and
P2 = B1/M + 1;B1 = B + 2LAF−M−1
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Prefix operations in routers
The two main entities that control the routing behaviour of a router are the Routing
Information Base (RIB) and the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) [23]. The RIB
indicates which is the best next hop to arrive to a given prefix. It is protocol-specific,
i.e., there is a RIB per routing protocol and it includes all information needed by the
routing protocol to compute its best paths. The router consolidates the information
coming from all RIBs in the FIB. When a packet is delivered to a router, it uses the
FIB to calculate the output link the packet has to be sent through.
When an IP packet arrives at a router, the FIB is traversed and the prefix with the
longest mask that satisfies Definition 6 is looked for. Prefixes in the routing table are
ordered in such a way that from two prefixes with the same base address and different
mask lengths B/M1, B/M2, the prefix with the longest mask length will be looked up
first. A special prefix 0/0 is used to represent the default route used by a router to send
the packets to. If this default route does not exist in the routing table, the router will
not find any feasible routing entry for some destination addresses and packets destined
to these addresses will be dropped. Figure 2.1 represents the process graphically.
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Figure 2.1: Routing table and routing process
The core of the Internet is known as the Default Free Zone (DFZ), because the
BGP-4 routing table of the routers in this special zone of the Internet does not contain
the default route 0/0. In order to guarantee that all packets can be processed, the
full range of public IPv4 addresses needs to be covered by the prefixes stored in these
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routers. Routing tables in the Default Free Zone (DFZ) are the longest and most resource
demanding routing tables in the Internet.
2.2 The Routing Process
Routing in IP networks is a distributed process. Each router receives advertisements with
reachability information regarding certain prefixes from its neighbours. This information
is passed to the Route Decision Process of the routing protocol. As a result, new routes
to these prefixes might be installed in the router’s routing table. These new routes will
be advertised to other neighbours. Routers in complex IP networks run several routing
protocols in parallel, and this general principle applies for each routing protocol which
is activated. The best example for this is the interaction between the Interior Gateway
Protocol (IGP) or IGPs and BGP-4 in an AS. IGPs like OSPF [24] or IS-IS [25], provide
quick re-convergence times in cases of failure. However, IGPs are not able to handle the
amount of routing information required by the Internet’s DFZ. This is what BGP-4 was
designed for. Therefore, AS administrators use the IGP to control the routing within
their AS and make sure that the routing information handled by the IGP, which is
relevant to the whole Internet, is redistributed into BGP-4. BGP-4 routers follow this
general principle, and also include route filters which allow to selectively modify the
routing information before and after it is processed by the route decision process (see
Section 2.5) and import and export functions to other intra-domain routing protocols
executed by the router. These filters and import/export functions implement routing
policies.
Figure 2.2 shows the path followed by the BGP-4 routing information in a router.
As explained in Section 3.3, BGP-4 route filters compare route attributes in order to
discard or further process prefixes and, eventually, modify the attributes attached to
them. One example of routes which need to be discarded are routes to private prefixes
in IPv4 and similar prefixes which are not routed in the IPv4 Internet [26]. Incoming
updates referring to these prefixes should be ignored and outgoing updates should never
be generated.
2.3 Source routing
In addition to routing by destination, the original specifications of the IPv4 and IPv6
protocols also included the possibility of source routing, i.e., indicating a number of
nodes that needed to be traversed by a specific packet. Source routing has been disabled
in Provider Networks [27]. Additionally, research on network security conducted in
2007 [28] showed that specifically crafted source routing information could result in
routing loops with traffic amplification that can lead to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Therefore it was rapidly proposed to be deprecated for IPv4 [29] and IPv6 [30, 31].
Currently, source routing is only used in very specific scenarios [32, 33]. For all these
reasons I do not consider IP Source Routing solutions in my work.
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Figure 2.2: BGP-4 Routing information processing pipeline
2.4 BGP-4 protocol basics
The router or routers which connect an Autonomous System to other ASes are known as
border routers. Routing information exchange is done by means of the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP-4). This subsection discusses BGP-4 as defined in RFC 4271 [2].
The two routers at the ends of a BGP-4 session are said to be neighbours. BGP-4
mandates the exchange of routing information to be done over a TCP session using port
179. In addition to the control mechanisms provided by TCP, BGP-4 requires explicit
configuration of the neighbour’s IP address and ASN, and provides mechanisms to limit
the time-to-live field in the IP packets in order to provide some basic security. BGP-4
sessions between routers in different ASes are called exterior BGP-4 (eBGP) sessions,
while BGP-4 sessions between routers in the same AS are called interior BGP-4 (iBGP)
sessions.
iBGP sessions reach all routers in an AS that need to have knowledge of the Internet’s
routing table. These include all border routers connected to other ASes as well as selected
internal routers in the infrastructure of the AS that handle transit traffic between border
routers. In order to avoid routing loops, the original design of BGP-4 does not allow to
redistribute routing information from one iBGP to another iBGP session. The growth
of ISPs revealed a scalability problem in this design: there needs to be a full mesh of
iBGP sessions between all BGP-4 speakers in an AS and this number grows as O(n2)
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in a full mesh. RFC 4456 [34] introduced Route Reflectors (RRs) as an alternative to
full meshed iBGP sessions to cope with this limitation. An RR is a special router which
redistributes the iBGP information to other iBGP neighbours.
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Figure 2.3: The BGP-4 Finite State Machine
Table 2.1: BGP-4 Update Types
Open
Update
Keepalive
Notification
Figure 2.3 shows the Finite State Machine controlling the BGP-4 session as defined
by RFC 4271 [2]. It has 6 states. Transitions are controlled by 28 different event types
that are defined in the RFC. Depending on the state of the FSM, different transitions
are possible. Additionally, BGP-4 speakers exchange messages of one of the four types
shown in Table 2.1. Messages of the type Update are only sent when the FSM is in
the ‘ESTABLISHED’ state. They contain routing information and are referred to as
routing updates. BGP-4 uses incremental updating: after a first massive routing infor-
mation exchange to acquire the full routing tables of its neighbours, BGP-4 speakers only
exchange updates to inform their neighbours of changes in the routing table. BGP-4 in-
cludes sanity-check mechanisms and when a router receives a malformed routing update,
the BGP-4 session is reset, the FSM returns to the Idle state and the session establish-
ment procedure has to be repeated. This process has implications on the stability of the
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Internet. It is discussed in depth in Chapter 6 in the context of recent BGP-4 routing
storms.
Table 2.2: Attribute categories defined in RFC 4271
Well-known mandatory
Well-known discretionary
Optional transitive
Optional non-transitive
A routing update consists of up to two fields: an Advertisement field containing
one or more new prefixes that have appeared in the routing table and share common
attributes and a Withdraw field for one or more prefixes that have ceased to exist in
the routing table. Advertisements have attributes attached. Attributes belong to one of
the four categories shown in Table 2.2. All BGP-4 speakers must recognise well-known
attributes. Additionally, well-known mandatory attributes must be present in advertise-
ments. Optional attributes may or not be recognised by all BGP-4 implementations.
The attributes are used by the router in the Route Decision Process (RDP) (see Sec-
tion 2.5) to decide whether to install a new route in its routing table or not. Table 2.3
shows all attributes defined in RFC 4271 and includes how attributes are used depend-
ing on the nature of the BGP-4 session. Thus, mandatory attributes must be used and
discretionary attributes may or not be used. A special case is the LOCAL_PREF at-
tribute, which cannot appear in updates in eBGP sessions and is mandatory for updates
in iBGP sessions.
Table 2.3: BGP-4 attributes defined in RFC 4271
Attribute eBGP iBGP
ORIGIN mandatory mandatory
AS_PATH mandatory mandatory
NEXT_HOP mandatory mandatory
MULTI_EXIT_DISC discretionary discretionary
LOCAL_PREF forbidden mandatory
ATOMIC_AGGRE-
GATE
discretionary discretionary
(depends on action
to AS_PATH)
(depends on action
to AS_PATH)
AGGREGATOR discretionary discretionary
In order to accommodate new needs, additional attributes are defined in different
RFCs. Thus, for example, the AS_PATH and AGGREGATOR attributes have been
extended in order to cope with the new 4-byte Autonomous System Numbers defined
in RFC 4893 as discussed in Section 2.1.2. The new attributes are sent along with the
old attributes. Eventually, these attributes will substitute the original attributes, once
32-bit ASN are universally supported throughout the Internet.
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2.5 The Route Decision Process in BGP-4
When a router running BGP-4 receives more than one BGP-4 update for the same pre-
fix, it has to decide whether to install it in the FIB or not. The RDP is described in
RFC 4271 [2]. Figure 2.4 shows Cisco Systems’ implementation of the RDP [35]. It is en-
hanced with information collected from other vendors (e.g., Juniper). Vendor-dependent
steps are highlighted. One of these parameters is the ‘WEIGHT’. The WEIGHT of a
route is local to each router and thus not retransmitted. This parameter can be modi-
fied by the user and, by default, depends on the protocol that contributed the route at
this step. Cisco and Juniper, for example, assign different WEIGHTs to the different
protocols. Routes coming from an eBGP session are assigned a weight, routes coming
from an iBGP session receive a different weight and routes which were redistributed from
active IGP receive a different weight, depending on the specific protocol the route was
learnt from. The multi-path decision step was introduced to allow multiple routes to a
prefix to be installed in the routing table. This allows the implementation of load shar-
ing among routes [36, 37, 38] and prevents oscillations or non-deterministic behaviour
in large infrastructures with RRs [39]. The Cluster ID length comparison step is only
usable in routing configurations with RRs.
Different implementations of the Border Gateway Protocol and its extensions have
different default values for timers and processes specified by the RFCs. The implementa-
tion by Cisco Systems is described in [40] and a practical example of Juniper Networks’
implementation of the route decision process is shown in [41]. A practical guide of how
to implement communication networks mixing equipment from both vendors is provided
by [42]. This book describes the differences between the two implementations. This
is the major drawback of IETF as a body generating the specifications for the core
protocols governing the Internet. In order to comply with its charter, which does not
allow to standardise implementations, the definitions of some features may end up being
very vague. This has also had a negative impact on some of the core subsystems of the
Internet, like the Quality of Service components of the Differentiated Services framework
in RFC 2430 [43] and RFC 4594 [44].
This chapter has discussed the basic routing principles in an Internet core router
and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4). These principles apply in all operations on
the Internet. With the commercialisation of the Internet, different business models have
arisen. The next chapter describes the basics of traffic engineering in the Internet using
the mechanisms provided by BGP-4.
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In the non-commercial phase of the Internet, no attention was paid to the way
traffic was distributed at the interconnection links and to the costs of carrying the
traffic between Autonomous Systems. With its commercialisation, this cost came into
play. When the incumbent network operators started to offer Internet services, they
brought in their culture and inter-operator charging models [45, 46]. This chapter
analyses the impact of the commercialisation of the Internet on its routing infrastructure.
As explained in Section 2.3, source routing 1 in IP networks is problematic and has
been ruled out by the IETF. Therefore, traffic flows between Autonomous Systems are
controlled using BGP-4 based Traffic Engineering techniques.
1routing using a list of hops provided by the source
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This chapter describes the interconnection agreements that contain restrictions on
the traffic levels, traffic pricing policies, etc. and presents the Internet’s hierarchy and
relationships between ASes. Then it analyses basic BGP-4 techniques used by AS admin-
istrators in order to comply with interconnection agreements they sign and techniques
that can be used by an administrator to force their neighbouring ASes to comply. Most
of the insights on BGP-4 dynamics have been gained by analysing BGP-4 routing traffic.
This traffic has been collected at different points in the Internet thanks to the efforts of
specific projects like Oregon Routeviews and RIPE’s Routing Repository (RIPE RR),
which are described at the end of this chapter.
3.1 Interconnection between Autonomous Systems
3.1.1 Peering relationships
There are many realms in daily life where a client pays a single provider for a service and
that service can only be provided through the collaboration of several service providers.
The provider chosen by the client will have to negotiate settlements with the other
providers that have no direct relation with the client in order to provide that service.
Internet Service Providers provide clients with access to the Internet for a fee. Internet
services are spread all over the Internet and any particular ISP will need to be inter-
connected to other ISPs in order to be able to offer access to all Internet services to its
clients.The interconnection of ISPs implies that there is some sort of financial settlement
between them [46]. Financial settlements between ISPs are related with the financial
settlements between traditional telecommunications operators. Regarding commercial
settlements between ISPs, Huston [45, 46] and van der Berg [47] recognise three possible
models of commercial settlements between ISPs. In these settlements, an AS can
1. pay another AS to access a certain set of networks or region of the Internet
2. exchange traffic with other ASes in a fair way, providing access to certain regions
of the Internet, while gaining access to others in exchange.
3. get payed by other ASes for providing access to a certain region in the Internet
The rules that govern the commercial settlements between ISPs control which routing
information is advertised on a specific BGP-4 session [46] that results in an Autonomous
System assuming one of the following roles: a) customer, b) provider, c) peer or d) sibling.
This classification is translated into the following rules for routing [45, 46]:
• an AS exports its own and its customer routes, but usually not its provider or peer
routes to its providers.
• an AS exports its own and its customer routes, as well as its provider or peer
routes to its customers.
• an AS exports its own and its customer routes, but usually not its provider or peer
routes to a peer.
• an AS exports its own and its customer routes as well as its provider or peer routes
to a sibling.
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These rules shape the view of the AS tree perceived by each router in the Internet.
They are also used by Gao [48] when trying to infer relationships between Autonomous
Systems from an AS graph obtained from data extracted from BGP-4 routing tables
through looking glasses [49] and similar tools.
3.1.2 Service Level Agreements
Internet Service Providers organise their interconnection through peering agreements,
which include the definition of technical and economic conditions under which they ex-
change traffic. The technical definitions include addressing space that is made mutually
accessible, the mechanisms to route traffic through the interconnection links and IP layer
parameters like round-trip delay and tolerated levels of packet loss and acceptable traffic
levels for the in- and outbound links. The commercial terms of a peering agreement in-
clude payment policies and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) which guarantee up-times
and penalise non-conforming behaviour. Examples of current SLA for different network
services including IP connectivity can be found in [50] and [51]. SLAs introduce an ad-
ditional incentive for mechanisms to control the in- and outbound traffics of a network
and, thus, for the implementation of Traffic Engineering (TE) techniques.
3.1.3 Autonomous System Types
The interconnection of the Autonomous Systems of the Internet is done in a hierarchical
way. The core of the Internet is formed by a group of ASes that have a global footprint
and, therefore, can reach any location without the need of hiring external connectiv-
ity. ASes at this hierarchical level in the Internet are known as Tier 1 providers [52].
Providers directly connected to this core are known as Tier 2 providers. They, in turn,
provide connectivity to other providers, and so forth. In a relationship between two
ASes, the AS that is topologically nearer to the end user is said to be the downstream
provider, while the AS that is nearer to the core of the Internet is said to be the upstream
provider [53].
Two kinds of ASes can be distinguished: those connected to one upstream provider
and those connected to several autonomous systems. ASes connected to a single up-
stream provider are known as stub-ASes and RFC 1930 [14] recommends the use of
private Autonomous System Numbers assigned by the upstream provider. This kind of
ASes will not appear in the Internet’s core routing table as such. Stub ASes advertise a
prefix or set of prefixes to the Internet. They provide connection to the Internet to end
customers, i.e., they implement Retail ISP functionality. The use of public Autonomous
System Numbers is mandatory when an AS is connected to more than one AS.
In order to be able to send traffic to the Internet, retail ISPs also need to receive
routing information from their providers, but this information may be restricted to a
default route as opposed to the complete Internet routing table or full routing that is
received by transit network providers. When a retail ISP is connected through more
than one link to its upstream ISP or to more than one upstream ISP, it is said to be
multi-homing. A multi-homing ISP receives full routing from its upstream ISPs.
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3.2 Automating Traffic Engineering
Routing configurations to implement TE configurations like load balancing between
independent links to a major upstream ISP or load sharing between several upstream
ISPs were applied from the early days of the commercial Internet. They are described
in [36] and other books about BGP-4. However, predicting BGP-4 behaviour can be
impossible for a network manager in a competitive environment like the Internet. Griffin
and Wilfong [54] have demonstrated that BGP-4 is not always guaranteed to converge to
one single solution in the presence of policies. In such situations, BGP-4 may converge
to solutions other than the one intended. They also show that proving the correctness
of a router configuration is an NP-hard problem.
Since the effect of configuration changes cannot always be predicted, arriving at the
traffic conditions in order to comply to the SLAs signed between an AS and its peers is
a process of Trial and Error: in a first step an initial routing configuration is deployed.
The resulting behaviour of the AS is assessed by comparing the traffic distribution it
creates in the inter-provider links to an intended one or by measuring other significant
Quality of Service parameters specified in the SLA. In a third step, modifications to
the initial routing configuration are computed and deployed. Then, a new cycle of
measurement and reconfiguration is started. This approach is documented for academic
solutions [55, 56, 57] and can be derived from the little information published for some
commercial network traffic control tools like netVMG [58].
3.3 Routing policies
Routing policies are the main tool for implementing traffic engineering in BGP-4 net-
works. Routing policies are configured in routers and express a set of possible actions on
an update that are taken depending on the route attribute values. Operators modify the
BGP-4 attributes for an advertisement in order to control the routing decisions inside or
outside their AS. Current implementations of BGP-4 allow most route attributes to be
modified a) in the inbound sense before being further processed by the router, or b) in
the outbound sense just before being sent to other routers. Filtering strategies which
are present in almost all routers in the Internet can be differentiated in three classes:
1. Filters that directly influence the routing in the own autonomous system, i.e., by
changing the Local Preference (LOCAL_PREF) attribute of a route depending
on specific incoming route attributes.
2. Filters that pass the decision to filters in their BGP-4 peers. Routes are tagged
by modifying the COMMUNITY attribute and peers take routing decisions based
on the value or set of values carried by this attribute.
3. Filters that influence the routing decisions in the own and downstream autonomous
systems. The attributes which are manipulated in this case are the Autonomous
System Path (AS_PATH), the Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED), or both.
These techniques are described in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5.
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One of the main problems faced by an AS administrator is when and how to deploy
changes in an AS’s routing policies because a change in the policies requires that the
current routing information be re-interpreted in the light of the new policies. The initial
design of BGP-4 did not foresee such a situation and recalculation was only possible
with a BGP-4 session restart. This procedure affects all routes installed in a router
and potentially blacked out sections of the Internet for significant periods of time [59].
RFC 2918 [60] describes the Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4 which allows BGP-4
neighbours to negotiate re-advertisements without the need of restarting the session.
This mechanism provides the possibility of resending routes through the Route Decision
Process upon modified policies and is known as the Soft Reset Mechanism in the Cisco
Systems manuals [61]. When the route refresh capability is not implemented by a
router, Cisco System routers offer the possibility of inbound soft reconfiguration. Routers
implementing this feature construct a version of the routing table as received from the
neighbour, i.e., without applying any local policies. This clean routing table is processed
by the currently active policy filters upon request. Both mechanisms are described in
[59].
3.4 Control of the inbound traffic
In this section, routing policies in an Autonomous System to control the inbound traffic
are discussed in two scenarios. They serve as the basis for the design of the alternative
BGP-4 solution for traffic engineering proposed in this work.
3.4.1 Collaborative Traffic Engineering
Current practises [36] include a marking scheme which allows the client a certain control
over its inbound traffic. This technique is normally documented in interconnection agree-
ment and allows, among others, traffic balancing. Figure 3.1a illustrates the principle
behind it.
The setup is described by Halabi in his BGP-4 tutorial [62], which served as a basis
for his book on BGP-4 routing in the Internet [36]. It uses the COMMUNITY attribute,
as defined in RFC 1997 [63], as a marker. The client AS (AS2 in Figure 3.1a) advertises
different prefixes and marks its advertisements with different values in the COMMU-
NITY attribute. These values are defined by the upstream AS (AS1 in Figure 3.1a).
The upstream AS translates the COMMUNITY attributes into different LOCAL_PREF
values within its AS and forces the routers to prefer the left link for prefix P1 and the
right link for prefix P2. Ideally, the upstream AS should also ask its clients to send their
best aggregations marked with a third community which it would use to advertise the
clients further into the Internet.
A very complete survey on the use of BGP-4 communities for TE purposes is provided
by Donnet and Bonaventure [64, 65]; they study the usage of communities until 2004
and how it has contributed to the Internet’s routing table growth. In this article they
explain the use of communities for inbound and outbound traffic control and propose a
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Figure 3.1: Multi-homing to one provider
taxonomy of communities. They also identify the main drawback of communities. As a
BGP-4 attribute, their meaning is local to the AS. The community attribute has four
well known values, shown in Table 3.1. The community NO_EXPORT, which is used
to prevent advertisements for a specific prefix to traverse the boundaries of the AS, is
the most widely used well-known community [65].
This same research group has tried to standardise a use of communities that would
make it easy for all ASes to understand the communities used by other ASes [66, 67].
They have proposed a new type of community, the “redistribution” community. This
extended community would allow a BGP-4 speaker to influence the way a specific route
should be redistributed towards other eBGP speakers it specifies.
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Mnemonic Value
NO_EXPORT 0xFFFFFF01
NO_ADVERTISE 0xFFFFFF02
NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED 0xFFFFFF03
NOPEER 0xFFFFFF04
Table 3.1: Well known values for the COMMUNITY attribute
3.4.2 AS_PATH Prepending multi-homing scenarios
The AS_PATH attribute is an ordered list of all ASes which have been traversed by
an advertisement. When a route is propagated through the Internet, each AS modifies
the AS_PATH attribute by prepending its own Autonomous System Number to the
received AS_PATH attribute. As explained in Section 2.5, Figure 2.4, the length of
AS_PATH attribute is the third criterion used by the Route Decision Process to assign
the precedence to an advertisement. The shorter the AS_PATH is, the more the route
will be preferred. AS_PATH Prepending adds more than one instance of the ASN at
the beginning of the AS_PATH, making it thereby artificially longer. This makes the
associated advertisement less preferable to the Route Decision Process.
3.4.2.1 Multi-homing to one provider
Figure 3.1b shows a scenario where the provider (AS2) is not involved in the TE config-
urations of the client (AS1). This case is the most common situation, because it gives
the client more freedom. The basic principle, as in the previous case, is to partition
the assigned prefix or prefixes into sub-prefixes which are advertised over all links to
the provider AS. The outbound policies apply different AS_PATH Prepending on the
prefixes depending on the link being a primary or a backup link.
3.4.2.2 Multi-homing to more than one provider
When the main source of inbound traffic for an AS lies beyond the directly connected
upstream ASes, the only reliable solution is to use AS_PATH Prepending. Figure 3.2
shows such a scenario.
In the absence of AS_PATH Prepending, a configuration like the one presented in
Figure 3.2 will leave the final decision of which path to use to send traffic from AS4 to
AS1 in the hands of the internal configuration of AS4. AS1 will have no control over
this decision. In the configuration shown in Figure 3.2, AS4 will prefer to send traffic
for prefix B/M (which is advertised by AS1) through AS2. This preference is controlled
by AS1.
Figure 3.3 shows the side effects of AS_PATH Prepending. Starting from the stable
configuration depicted in Figure 3.2, the two intermediate ASes AS2 and AS3 establish
a direct peering. Since AS1 is a client of both Autonomous Systems, they will in-
clude it in their routing information exchange. The traffic from AS3 to AS1 is diverted
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Prefix
1 1 1
...
Prefix
3 1 1 1
...
Figure 3.2: AS_PATH prepending to control traffic flows
through AS2, since the AS_PATH to AS1’s prefix advertised by AS2 is shorter than the
AS_PATH advertised through the direct connection. The extreme case is when AS1 is
prepending just by one. AS3 will receive two advertisements with the same AS_PATH
length. The RDP will have to use other attributes to select the advertisement and might
eventually select the direct link between AS1 and AS3, yielding a routing configuration
which is apparently correct. However, this is a hidden bug in the network. These bugs
might be difficult to correct, because the network documentation will not correspond
with reality.
As far as Traffic Engineering is concerned, AS_PATH Prepending is one of the most
widely used techniques, as the POTAROO [68] BGP-4 studies site confirms. This tech-
nique is described in all BGP-4 manuals, e.g., [36]. AS_PATH Prepending is a popular
Traffic Engineering technique, because it is able to control the behaviour of distant
ASes. However, Donnet and Bonaventure point out in their study on the use of BGP-4
communities [64] that communities are being used in some ASes in order to request
AS_PATH Prepending on outbound links: advertisements marked with a specific com-
munity are subject to different AS_PATH Prepending policies in different outbound
links. This allows to mark the preference of the different inbound links for different
network prefixes.
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Figure 3.3: Side effects of AS_PATH prepending
3.5 Control of the outbound traffic
Controlling the inbound traffic with the techniques shown in the previous section has an
effect on the advertisements generated by an Autonomous System that can be observed
from the outside. Controlling the outbound traffic of an AS is implemented in a similar
way. AS administrators modify the view of the Internet perceived by the AS by applying
routing policies to the advertisements received from their upstream ASes. This technique
is described in [69]. In most cases, the use of these techniques cannot be observed from
the outside.
Tools to control the outbound traffic of an AS are described by Uhlig et al. for the
specific case of a stub AS [70]. They list commercially available tools to implement
Traffic Engineering and propose a device that inserts additional BGP-4 advertisements
in an AS’s routing infrastructure in order to control the outbound traffic. They also
propose to use similar techniques to control traffic in transit ASes [55]. In their tax-
onomy of BGP-4 communities [64], Donnet and Bonaventure try to derive the use of
the Community attribute in some configurations for outbound traffic control. While
mapping communities to AS_PATH Prepending can be achieved with a relatively high
level of confidence, mappings for outbound policies can only be guessed. This results in
ISP administrators resorting to TE techniques based on trial-and-error, as described in
Chapter 5.
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3.6 Stability of BGP-4 and Routing Storms
Griffin et al. started to study the convergence properties of BGP-4 in 1999[54]. This
paper presented first criteria to check whether a specific router configuration with
routing policies might converge or was likely to produce divergent network conditions,
i.e., oscillations. As a result of these studies, Griffin introduced the Stable Path Prob-
lem (SPP) [71]. Obradovic continued the study of the SPP and the Simple Path Vector
Protocol (SPVP) [72], where he provides a first model for real-time behaviour of BGP-4
that yields an upper bound for the convergence time of BGP-4.
Several studies correlating worm attacks and increased BGP-4 activity have been
published. Roughan et al. use the term routing storm for a “a sharp increase in the
number of BGP updates exchanged between BGP routers” in [73]. In this article they
conclude that a routing storm does not always impact on the data plane performance of
the Internet.
More recently, Suchara et al. have resumed the study of BGP-4 abnormalities [74].
The study five sources of BGP-4 instability: route flap dampening, the Minimum Route
Advertisement Interval (MRAI) timers, queueing mechanisms in the routers, clusters of
routers and recent extensions to BGP-4 that were proposed to improve the convergence
time and reliability. In their study, they extend the SPVP used by Griffin to capture spu-
rious phenomena and model BGP-4 using the Dynamic Path Vector Protocol (DPVP).
Their study yields the conditions under which BGP-4 converges, even in the presence of
extensions.
When BGP-4 oscillates, there are different levels of impact on the Internet. In the
specific case of excessive BGP-4 traffic, following effects, among others, may interfere
with the performance of Internet routers:
1. Overload due to the level of BGP-4 traffic: the router is not able to receive and/or
deliver all client traffic.
2. Resource exhaustion: due to the amount of BGP-4 routing messages, the router
is not able to process them or to store the resulting routing information in the
routing or in the switching modules.
BGP-4 routing anomalies have also been analysed by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) of the United States of America as a potential for network
disruption [75]. This report also analyses other potential weaknesses and security flaws
of the BGP-4 protocol.
3.7 Routing repositories
Most of the insights on how TE using BGP-4 is impacting the Internet have been ob-
tained from extensive BGP-4 traffic collections stored in different routing repositories
in the Internet. These repositories where initially established by projects like Oregon
RouteViews [76] or RIPE’s Routing Information Service (RIPE RIS) [3] as a joint effort
of Internet Service Providers and the research community. Their initial objective was to
provide a means to study the response of BGP-4 in a very large-scale deployment like
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the Internet by exploring how prefixes propagated through the Internet. The BGP-4
traffic used in this work is stored in the RIPE’s Routing Repository. This repository
collects data from different contributing entities, including several of the major Internet
Exchanges and RIPE’s own Default Free Zone (DFZ).
Each entity designates a series of peers which send their BGP-4 traffic to a collecting
device. Each collecting device is a modified BGP-4 router that
1. does not send any routing information back to its peers
2. stores all the BGP-4 updates it receives in files that cover a period of 5 minutes
3. stores every eight hours a snapshot of the routing tables of its peers.
The design of the RIPE RR is presented in [4]. As shown in Figure 3.4, the RIPE RR
is highly structured. The collecting device is directly mapped to the geographical region
of the Internet where the contributing entity is located. The RIPE RR files are then
grouped by month and year when they were collected. This directory structure can be
accessed using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [77].
bviews
(routing tables)
RIPE RCC
rrc-nn
rrc-01
yyyy-mm
updates
(BGP-4 traffic)
Collector
Directories
Files
Records
Timestamp Peer 1
Attr ...
Attr ...
Timestamp Peer n
rrc-00
yyyy-mm
Month
Directories
Figure 3.4: The structure of the RIPE’s Routing Repository
The RIPE RR files use the so called “MRT binary format”. This format was initially
used in Merit’s Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit (MRT) [78]. Although the programs
in the MRT are completely outdated and have not been updated since 2001, the file
format was adopted and fostered by the Global Routing Working Group (GROW) in
the IETF. It was adopted as an RFC just before the Fall’2011 IETF meeting in Taipei
as RFC 6396 [79]. The MRT file format has evolved and the RIPE RR contains files in
two different formats: before the 27th of March 2007, the files use the format specified
in version 01 of the Internet draft specifying the MRT format. Starting that date, the
files are stored in version 04 format, in order to add support for 4-byte ASNs.
The routing repositories suffer from different shortcomings. As the raw data access
page of the RIPE RR [80] shows, there are two types of collectors: currently active
collectors and collectors which have ceased collecting data. Additionally, as Table 3.2
shows for the case of RRC00, the collecting devices within a given collector are not
always active for the whole period in which the collector is active. Another source of
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uncertainty that has to be taken into account is the software on which the collecting
devices rely. In 2003, Kong described different software bugs that affect the RIPE’s
BGP-4 collections [81]. These bugs were discovered in the BGP-4 collector frontend,
which is implemented using the Zebra [82] routing software suite or its open-sourced
fork Quagga [83]. Recently, Cheng et al. have studied the routing repositories [84] and
developed methods to detect BGP-4 session restarts in monitors. They use the session
restarts as an indicator for potential data incompleteness and apply their method to data
collectors of the RIPE RR and the Oregon Routeviews. Their Web site [85] provides
information regarding BGP-4 session problems for some of the BGP-4 monitors of both
projects. Although the routing repositories are far from perfect, they provide a valuable
source of data for the study of BGP-4. All data used in this work to analyse the different
trends and threats in the Internet can be found in the RIPE RR.
This chapter has discussed the basics of traffic engineering in the Internet using the
mechanisms provided by BGP-4. It has also discussed the current level of understanding
of the causes for BGP-4 oscillation and routing storms. In the light of this recently
gained insight regarding the conditions for convergence and stability of BGP-4, some of
the Current Practises in Traffic Engineering using BGP-4 will need to be revised. This
insight is also reflected in the architecture I propose in Chapter 8, where I create a basic,
Internet-wide routing plane that is isolated from a local routing plane, where policies
are applied.
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Table 3.2: Lifetime of IPv4 collector peers for RRC00 of the RIPE-RIS Database
Peer Start End
193.0.0.56 01/01/2001
195.47.235.100 10/05/2006
168.209.255.123 01/03/2008
217.64.144.1 01/05/2009
91.103.24.2 01/07/2010
46.227.200.68 01/03/2011
12.0.1.63 23/12/2003
193.136.5.1 25/02/2007
218.189.6.2 01/06/2008
203.119.76.3 01/08/2009
202.12.28.1 01/11/2010
212.25.27.44 01/03/2011
202.12.28.190 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
12.127.0.121 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
193.148.15.34 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
203.37.255.126 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
195.66.224.112 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
206.251.0.85 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
195.211.29.254 01/03/2001 01/02/2011
202.12.29.64 30/11/2001 01/02/2011
212.20.151.234 01/09/2001 01/02/2011
194.109.197.245 30/10/2003 01/02/2011
213.179.39.65 29/11/2005 01/02/2011
213.200.87.254 30/01/2007 01/06/2008
203.119.0.116 01/07/2007 01/02/2011
145.125.80.5 01/10/2008 01/11/2009
208.51.134.248 01/10/2004 01/12/2007
129.250.0.232 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
192.65.184.3 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
212.20.151.253 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
134.222.87.12 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
193.148.15.85 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
212.47.190.1 01/01/2001 01/02/2011
64.211.147.146 01/09/2001 01/02/2011
192.205.31.33 28/02/2002 01/02/2011
195.69.144.34 26/09/2003 01/02/2011
168.209.255.2 30/03/2004 01/02/2011
193.138.164.1 19/04/2006 01/02/2011
145.125.80.62 01/04/2007 01/02/2011
91.103.24.1 01/04/2008 01/02/2011
195.28.164.125 01/05/2009 01/02/2011
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This chapter discusses other published research in the main fields covered by my
work. I separately discuss routing architectures and specific error response mechanisms
proposed for BGP-4. I also include an analysis of open source BGP-4 implementations
I considered for my prototype implementation and some notes on available parsers for
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BGP-4 traffic stored in route collectors, since I have spent some time developing my own
analysis tools and all data on the evolution of the Internet I include in this work are
generated by these tools.
4.1 Routing Architectures
The Traffic Engineering solutions based on BGP-4 presented in the previous chapter are
static solutions which take advantage of basic techniques like address space fragmenta-
tion and attribute manipulation. Current state of the art solutions for TE in the Internet
take advantage of these basic techniques but go beyond their mere application. Some
of the problems that advanced techniques try to address are the depletion of the IPv4
addressing space, the growth of the Internet’s routing table, and mobility. This section
compiles efforts done in this field and compares them with the solutions I propose in
this work.
4.1.1 Routing table compression solutions
One of the problems I address with my proposal is the growth of the routing table in the
Internet’s DFZ. It has been addressed by different talks in Network Operator forums like
SANOG-6 in 2005. Smith gave a talk on the aggregation problem [86] explaining that
there are different causes for the current state. These range from technical education
that needs a complete overhaul and lack of training of the teams in charge of network
operation to economic aspects like pressure to deliver services on a day-to-day basis or
lack of stability of these teams. Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the number of routing
entries in the Internet’s Default Free Zone between January 2001 and December 2010.
Besides the sheer number of entries, each entry has a significant amount of attributes
associated to it. The result is that storage space needed to accommodate the routing
table of the Internet’s Default Free Zone has grown significantly.
Despite this, Fall et al. [87] argue that there is no sound technological reason to
compress routing tables in routers. Moore’s Law is driving cost-effective scaling of
hardware performance in excess of the Internet’s growth, making major reductions in
routing table sizes potentially unnecessary. Their router model takes computation power
and memory size requirements into account and they come to the conclusion that new
multi-core processor and high speed memory architectures are sufficient to keep up with
the pace of growth of the Internet. While their line of argument might stand from a
purely processor-oriented approach, it forgets that keeping well-aggregated routing tables
helps reducing the risk of undesired routes being introduced into them and reduces the
effort to debug them in case of failures.
I have explored two kinds of the routing table compression algorithms to compare
them with my approach:
1. compression algorithms specific to routing tables. These try to achieve the small-
est information structure representing the mapping between prefixes and their
associated next hops.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the Number of Routing Entries in the Internet’s Default Free
Zone derived from data stored in RIPE’s Route Repository
2. general data structure compression algorithms that can be applied to the informa-
tion stored in the routing table. These take into account more factors (i.e., fields
of the data structure) than the mere prefix-to-next-hop mapping in their compu-
tations.
Routing table compression algorithms like the Optimal Routing Table Constructor
or ORTC [88] proposed by Draves et al. produce relevant levels of compression for
longest prefix match databases relating prefixes to their next hop. However, the authors
propose the use of BGP-4 to exchange routing information and the use of ORTC locally
on each router in such a way that it does not affect BGP-4. This shows that ORTC
is a FIB compression algorithm. In 1999, when this paper was written, the distinction
between the Routing Information Base and the Forwarding Information Base in a router
had not been introduced. The continued use of BGP-4 as is does not alleviate the
main problem addressed by my work: the spreading of local configurations to regions of
the Internet where they do not offer any additional information to the Route Decision
Process and only bloat the routing tables. The situation ten years later had not changed
dramatically. Ballani et al. [89] aimed at reducing the size of the RIB at specific routers
in the Internet. However, they conclude that, for their purposes, FIB compression is a
more realistic objective.
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Generalised compression algorithms like the one proposed by Suri, Sandholm and
Warkhede [90] take into account rules which apply to a combination of the source and
destination address fields. Their main application field is switching devices for layers
above IP, like Layer-4 to Layer-7 switches. In their reduction to one dimension, they
introduce the concept of background prefix to mimic longest prefix matching. By doing
so, they violate one of the main principles in Internet routing, i.e., that transit ASes
should not create new prefixes nor suppress prefixes generated by other ASes. In my
work, the responsibility of advertising prefixes lies in the AS that generates them. Their
scope is fixed by selecting different advertisement paths: best aggregations through the
global BGP-4 path and TE prefixes using the TE extension.
SMALTA [91] describes an interesting solution for routing table compression that
its authors claim is compatible with BGP-4. This proposal has also been proposed to
the IETF [92]. In order to maintain backward compatibility with all routing protocols
and achieve compression at FIB level, the proposed algorithm needs to store an inter-
mediate state which is used to derive the changes needed in the FIB when a routing
update arrives at the router. This implies that extra storage and computing resources
are needed in the routers implementing SMALTA. This proposal does not address the
problem of RIB growth in the Internet’s DFZ due to de-aggregation. In fact, a well-
aggregated RIB would lessen the benefits of SMALTA. Additionally, SMALTA does not
keep routing information related to configurations with limited topological scope, e.g., a
traffic-balancing setup between two providers, from spreading through the Internet.
4.1.2 Alternative routing architectures
In order to cope with the explosive growth of the Internet in general and of the routing
table in the Default Free Zone, there have been several proposals of modified routing
architectures for the Internet in the last years. A common element in all of them is the
anticipation of the deployment of IPv6. Although the lifetime of IPv4, as of writing
this work, is very limited, there are still a significant number of open issues regarding a
global IPv6 deployment strategy. With respect to routing, the currently proposed IPv6
inter-domain scenarios exclude the possibility of multi-homing. The proposals examined
in this section all try to simplify the routing mechanisms to cope with the growth of
the Internet’s DFZ routing table, but do not examine the reasons for this growth. In
addition to proposing algorithms to compress the ‘routing table’, meaning either the
FIB or the RIB, some authors have gone further and proposed radically new approaches
to inter-domain routing. Some approaches claim to have beneficial impact on Traffic
Engineering inside the AS or ISP infrastructure in general. These approaches have been
too radical to be fully deployed in the Internet’s core.
Separating routing and forwarding in different devices was proposed by
Feamster et al. [93]. The authors introduce a new level of routing devices in a separate
control plane and make those devices control the routing in the realm of an AS, while
the current routers implement a data plane which is specialised in forwarding packets.
They claim that Traffic Engineering functions inside the AS can be implemented easier
and in a more consistent way. However, they do not address inter-AS traffic engineering
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and do not study the impact of their platform on the size of the routing table in the
DFZ in the Internet.
An attempt to address the problem of inter-domain TE in Multi-Protocol Label
Switching (MPLS) or Generalised MPLS (G-MPLS) networks is provided by the Path
Computation Element (PCE) [94]. The PCE implements constraint-based path com-
putation for a domain and provides the interfaces and mechanisms to extend it to a
multi-domain environment, e.g., an AS Confederation or several ASes belonging to dif-
ferent providers. RFC 4655 describes a method to implement TE beyond a network
domain, but is restricted to MPLS networks. It presents the additional drawback of
introducing a single point of failure in the network. The PCE concept integrates well
with inter-AS TE implementations for MPLS networks as outlined by RFC 4216 [95].
TE extensions for interior routing protocols are defined in RFC 3630 [96] for OSPF [24]
and RFC 5305 [97] for IS-IS RFC 1195. None of the aforementioned approaches provides
TE extensions that can be used by BGP-4. The effectiveness of all methods is increased
when the granularity of the routing table is increased. In the case of the OSPF and
IS-IS TE extensions, the growth of the routing table is initially localised in the domain
covered by the interior routing protocol. However, these routes can be injected into
the BGP-4 routing tables easily through route redistribution. Once these routes are in-
stalled in the BGP-4 table, they can easily spread to the Internet’s Default Free Routing
Zone. In my proposal, these routes are redistributed to the additional BGP-4 session
used to exchange local routes and not to the main BGP-4 session. Thus, they are not
propagated to the routing tables in the DFZ.
Cohen and Shochot [98] analyse the shortcomings of BGP-4 and propose an alterna-
tive routing overlay to which ASes can connect using BGP-4. This overlay would hide all
the routing processes at a global level. The proposal enumerates the routing algorithms
needed in such an overlay and the potential benefits with regards to new services that
could be offered. However, it does not include a detailed design of the internals of the
proposed architecture.
Virtual Aggregation (VA) [89] as a means to compress the FIB or the RIB in the
Default Free Zone of the Internet is discussed by Ballani et al.. The routing space is
divided into virtual aggregated prefixes and routers within an ISP are designated as
aggregation points for these virtual prefixes. These aggregation points direct the traffic
towards the border routers which the global Internet routing information would designate
as next hops within the network of the ISP. Although this proposal can significantly
reduce the size of the FIB in most routers and may ease some aspects of TE within the
ISP, it does not help avoid de-aggregation as a means of implementing TE configurations
between two ASes. Virtual prefixes are also proposed by Zhang et al. with their Core
Router-Integrated Overlay (CRIO) [99] as a means to shrink the routing table. In their
simulations, they reduce table size by an order of magnitude at the price of allowing
intra-AS traffic to be routed outside the AS.When they constrain the intra-AS traffic to
be routed inside the AS, the reduction obtained is less. In this case, they only achieve
a reduction by a factor of 5.
VA has gained momentum in the Global Routing Working Group (GROW) of the
IETF. Internet drafts on simple VA strategies [100], auto-configuration for VA [101]
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and strategies to selectively suppress FIB entries when using VA [102] have been lately
discussed with the general objective of producing an IETF-sanctioned VA framework.
The authors claim that their solution can be incrementally and independently deployed
in ASes throughout the Internet and that it neither requires changes in BGP-4 nor in
the forwarding mechanisms of MPLS routers if and where they are used. They also
claim that deploying the VA framework in an AS is transparent to the rest of the Inter-
net. The additional elements they introduce to the Internet’s routing architecture are
what they call FIB-Installing Router (FIR) and FIB-Suppressing Router (FSR), which
are responsible to generate the virtually aggregated FIBs for the AS and to suppress it
when communicating with other ASes, respectively. This architecture is more complex
when compared to mine and introduces an additional level of complexity when managing
the network: routers inside an AS have routing information that might not be consis-
tent with the Internet routing tables, making debugging tools deployed in the Internet
(e.g., looking glasses) more difficult to use. With my proposals, the main routing tables
are consistent with the Internet routing tables and those tools can be used.
CRIO [99] proposes an overlay network of core routers that use tunnelling techniques
like IP-GRE [103] or MPLS between ISPs and virtual prefixes to cope with routing
table growth. Tunnelling provides a clean separation between topology and addressing.
Additionally, it reduces the dynamics of the routing protocol because the backbone
topology is very stable and most of the dynamics in BGP-4 are introduced by changes
in the peripheral topology of the network. The authors also claim that CRIO allows
multi-homing to be implemented without additionally burdening the routing table of
the core network and show it by applying the architecture to the Internet and to MPLS-
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [104] with hub-and-spoke topology. Both exploit all
the benefits of the CRIO architecture optimally. However, CRIO needs a new naming
system to cope with the separation between network core and peripheral networks and
this may be the main blocking factor for its deployment.
NIRA [105] is the acronym for a New Internet Routing Architecture proposed by
Yang in 2003. The paper outlines a proposal for routing in an IPv6 network which takes
into account that the evolution of the Internet from IPv4 to IPv6 should not disturb
current inter-AS relationships proposed by Gao [48]. One of the objectives of NIRA is to
empower the users to determine the way the packets are forwarded in a potential “New
Internet”. Yang claims that this level of user empowerment would steer competition,
would impose economic discipline in ISPs and foster innovation. The main contributions
of NIRA are a hierarchical provider-rooted addressing scheme to identify hosts and the
need for end users to keep topological information of the transit networks she or he uses
or intends to use. Computation of end-to-end routes is done by the traffic source based
on topological information regarding the destination. This information is collected on
demand and the author claims that it is thereby not necessary for all users to perform this
computations. NIRA uses a hierarchical addressing scheme similar to the one proposed
for the IPv6 Internet, where domains in the “core” of the network delegate addressing
space to “downstream” domains which are connected to them. These, in turn, delegate
addresses to their downstream domains, etc. The aspect that deserves most criticism in
the NIRA proposal is the fact that packets have to carry the route specification in the
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header. This represents an additional overhead on the header structure, which is not
quantified in their work. Additionally, the same threats described for source routing in
Section 2.3 apply here.
NIRA proposes a disruptive, clean-slate approach that implies a lot of non-backward
compatible changes to the Internet. Some concepts are taken from proposals for the IPv6
Internet and may, therefore, be common practise in the near future. Others, however,
introduce significant overhead in the communication itself or in the end devices. TE is
implemented at a high price: the end devices control the path followed by the packets
and therefore need to implement path computation algorithms and keep state in order
to send packets. My proposal does not involve any changes in the end device or in the
IP protocol and reduces the impact of TE on the network.
SIRA [106] is a proposal for a scalable Internet routing architecture proposed by
Zhang et al.. In their argumentation, they identify the conflict between customers re-
questing Provider Independent (PI) addressing space for freedom and providers wanting
to allocate Provider Assigned (PA) addressing space for aggregation and scalability pur-
poses. This already happens, since some customers with large enough networks can
request address space from the RIRs independently. They also identify that the size of
the routing table depends on the product of the number of ISPs by the number of Points
of Presence (POPs) per ISP by the number of customers connected to them. The other
challenge for Internet scalability the authors identify is the update traffic generated by
TE. When analysing the key factors for the scalability problems faced by the Inter-
net today, they argue that the failure to differentiate between provider and customer
networks is the main factor that is behind the problems.
To overcome these problems, they propose to create a core or backbone network they
call Global Transit Network (GTN) that interconnects client networks. Individual hosts
are identified by their host address within the client network and the point of entry
into the network. However, they also state that a migration to such an architecture
faces several problems. The first is that they need to establish a new mapping service
for their architecture, similar to today’s Domain Name System (DNS) as defined in
RFC 1591 [107]. They also identify that another weak point of their proposal is that the
links between the providers and their customers are neither in the provider nor in the
customer infrastructure. Any failure will therefore need a special handling procedure.
The main challenge of this architecture is how to code the addresses of the end hosts.
Although the transition to IPv6 will provide a larger addressing space with room to code
GTN and customer addresses, the way of coding the addresses for hosts in a multi-homed
network is not addressed.
Separation of the core and the edge is also proposed by Jen et al., who also analyse the
problem of multi-homed sites or networks in the future IPv6 Internet [108]. They claim
that the current line of thought of assigning hosts in multi-homed networks one address
per upstream provider is not the way to go, because many networks have already been
assigned Provider Independent prefixes and transitioning to an Internet with Provider
Assigned prefixes only will therefore be impossible.
Locator-Identifier Separation has been under discussion since a workshop on scala-
bility of the Internet held by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in October, 2006
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in Amsterdam. With current architectures, the IP address is used both as Routing Lo-
cator (RLOC) and Endpoint Identifier (EID). This negatively impacts scalability and
functions like multi-homing and mobility. In order to overcome this problem, differ-
ent implementation proposals for the so-called “Locator/ID (Loc/ID) split” have been
presented [109, 110]. All proposals assume that the core infrastructure is efficiently ag-
gregated, something that is not the case today, as I show in Chapter 7. The Loc/ID split
can be implemented in the end systems or in the border routers. A strategy proposed
to implement the Loc/ID split is to “map-and-encapsulate”. From a routing point of
view, this strategy proposes that the IGP handles the EIDs of a routing domain and the
Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) handles RLOCs. The IGP is completely decoupled
from the EGP, which is assumed to be BGP-4. These proposals do not take the influence
of the translation between EID and RLOC into account. The standardisation state of
the different proposals varies. The Locator/ID Split Protocol (LISP) [109], which im-
plies no modifications in the host protocol stack, is supposed to be proposed as an RFC
by mid 2012. The complexity of the whole LISP framework and the migration to IPv6
after the depletion of the IPv4 address space have caused some redesign in the protocol.
Another proposal, the Host Identity Protocol [110] has reached the RFC status and is
being proposed in the context of IPv6 and as a migration tool in the transition from IPv4
to IPv6. However, all Loc/ID solutions exhibit several architectural drawbacks [111].
e.g., all solutions rely on BGP-4 to carry the information and would be vulnerable to
bogus route injection to divert traffic. My proposal also allows to construct well aggre-
gated routing tables for the Internet’s core, which is one of the main benefits promised
by Loc/ID solutions, but does not require any additional translation mechanisms or
patches in the network stack.
4.1.3 Traffic Engineering solutions based on BGP-4
In addition to alternative routing architectures which try to address the flaws of the
current Internet routing architecture or implement inter-domain TE solutions, there
has been interest in the academic and the commercial world to overcome the current
limitations of BGP-4 while keeping it as the routing protocol of choice. These solutions,
which are applicable to either transit or stub ASes, deal mostly with traffic optimisation.
They accept the fact that they have to introduce additional information to the BGP-4
infrastructure in order to accomplish their goals and try to minimise their impact.
4.1.3.1 Academic studies and TE solutions based on BGP-4
The interest of the academic community in BGP-4 has always been great and the problem
of TE using BGP-4 has been discussed under different perspectives. Regarding the
design of actual TE tools for the Internet, the research group around S. Uhlig and O.
Bonaventure has been very active. Based on their studies of BGP-4 Communities [112,
113], on their own proposals of how to use this BGP-4 attribute [66], and on a general
performance evaluation of BGP-4 TE solutions [113], they have proposed their own
BGP-4 TE solutions. When controlling the outbound traffic in stub ASes [70] they
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propose to inject additional BGP-4 advertisements to control the view of the Internet
perceived by the border routers. These advertisements are kept local in the AS and are
not re-distributed into the Internet. They represent a small fraction of the “normal”
BGP-4 traffic handled by the border routers and imply a negligible extra load for them
in terms of extra processing power and memory needed to handle them. In order to
generate this additional BGP-4 information, they express the target traffic distributions
as an objective function and use an evolutionary algorithm that allows to both optimise
the objective function and limit the number of extra iBGP messages needed.
An evolution of this principle is applied by Uhlig and Bonaventure in their Tweak-it
tool [55]. This tool is based on sending additional BGP-4 updates that are sent to the
ingress routers of a transit AS to control the inter-domain traffic over time. To this
end, it computes the steady-state view of BGP-4 routing inside the AS and the traffic
demands of the AS with a BGP-4 simulator and then applies a multiple-objectives
evolutionary heuristic that can deal with multiple conflicting objectives that can occur
in real networks.
While both solutions tend to minimise the BGP-4 traffic they introduce, they do not
achieve any reduction of the size of the routing tables in the DFZ.
4.1.3.2 Commercially available TE solutions
On the commercial front, there have been some efforts to produce technologies that
control the outbound traffic of an Autonomous System. These solutions are implemented
by or for larger ISPs who claim to provide better SLAs to clients than their competitors.
They use BGP-4 because it provides a well-known standard interface to clients. Several
companies like netVmg and Sockeye, acquired [58] by Internap [114] for their own
products [115], or Route-Science [116] offer or have offered “route control” services or
products that influence how a multi-homed site chooses the access link to its providers.
They complement the routing information and influence the next hop selection process.
Therefore, these technological solutions work for the outbound traffic only. The solution I
propose is conceived for controlling the inbound traffic of an AS. It can be complemented
by any of these solutions, although the incremental benefits of controlling the outbound
traffic should be carefully weighted against the additional management burden put on
the AS. Although the internal implementation details are confidential, all solutions claim
to be based on a control loop that adjusts the routing information according to some
Quality of Service (QoS) objectives. In a first phase, a certain routing configuration
is deployed on the infrastructure. Then QoS probes are activated, measurement data
is collected and evaluated, and eventually corrections on the routing configuration are
flushed into the network.
4.1.4 Higher-layer traffic engineering solutions
In addition to pure BGP-4 developments, there have been lately some efforts in the
IETF to offload TE tasks from routing and move them from the network to the termi-
nals. These solutions move away from the IP layer and try to control the traffic at the
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application layer. In this line of thought, there is a lot of activity around the Application-
Layer Traffic Optimisation (ALTO) architecture proposed in RFC 5693 [117]. ALTO is
an effort to control peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic in order to reduce peering costs for the
ISPs by localising it as much as possible within the ASes. In order to do so, the ISPs
participate in the P2P overlay and deploy so-called “tracker” devices. These devices
help the end terminals decide where to retrieve the contents and direct the terminals
towards those content sources that produce a lower strain on their network, for example,
by optimising peering costs. In recent proposals, the trackers use routing information
coming from the IGPs and BGP-4 to calculate the optimal content source.
These solutions radically differ from my approach in that they involve the end de-
vice. User intervention is needed in order to install an ALTO-compliant P2P client in
their terminals and this is the weakest point. Since a significant amount of users will
not be convinced about the solution, a mixed ecosystem is to be expected and the ben-
efits in terms of gains from optimised traffic versus complexity of managing the solution
and unexpected interactions in the network are still to be further investigated. Sim-
ulations show promising results [118] but feedback from realistic trials is still missing.
My proposal is completely transparent to the user and does not need any sort of user
intervention and yields a much more controllable network.
4.1.5 Debugging Network Configurations
My work is also significant when it comes to operating the Internet. As shown in
Section 7.1, fragmentation of the addressing space is significant. Fragmentation makes
the overall operation of the network more difficult because it increases the amount of
information which has to be processed in case of a failure. There have been efforts to
produce automated network debugging solutions or tools to help the operator debug
complex network failures [119]. The aim of my work is to clean up the Internet’s DFZ
routing table, in order to make the problem which has to be tackled by these systems
smaller and more manageable.
The other problem arising from complex routing tables is that they make the In-
ternet more susceptible to attacks like prefix hijacking [120], as shown by projects like
INTERSECTION [121]. A cleaner routing table in the DFZ would also allow simpler
and quicker implementations for tools that detect prefix hijacking like PHAS [122] and
simplify best common practises to handle illegal advertisements [26]. This problem is
described in a more general way by Feamster et al. [123] when analysing control plane
security properties of BGP-4.
In addition to addressing the operative problems of debugging possibly erroneous
network configurations, my work also addresses Internet storms related with the reaction
of BGP-4 to malformed packets. The related work in this field is discussed in the next
section.
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4.2 Alternative BGP-4 error handling
As presented in Chapter 2, BGP-4 reacts very drastically when errors are detected in
updates: it resets the BGP-4 session. This is at the origin of BGP-4 routing storms
detected in 2009: a peer was advertising a prefix with a malformed attribute. This
caused a session reset after which routing information was exchanged again. The prefix
with malformed attributes was received again and the cycle started all over again. To
the outside world, this incident appears as a route flap for all prefixes advertised by
the peer advertising malformed routing information. Currently, there are two different
philosophies how to handle updates with malformed updates while mitigating the risk
of routing storms: either denial (i.e., not recognising that the packet is malformed)
or partial reset (i.e., only resetting the BGP-4 session for the specific Address Family
where the malformed packet was detected). Currently, infrastructures with MPLS-based
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and IPv6 Internet services running over the same
infrastructure as IPv4 are common. This means that they use a common BGP-4 session
to exchange routing information and errors in one Address Family affect the others.
Therefore, there has also been an attempt to isolate the different Address Families in
different BGP-4 sessions to avoid that an error in a given Address Family affects the
whole routing infrastructure and service offerings of an Autonomous System.
4.2.1 Denial: handling confederation data in the AS4_PATH
attribute
The transition from 2-byte to 4-byte ASNs has been at the root of at least one big rout-
ing storm in 2009. The results from the analysis by Watanabe [6] show that updates
where the 4-byte AS_PATH (AS4_PATH) attribute contained one or more AS_CON-
FED_SEQUENCE field were interpreted by some routers as invalid and the affected
BGP-4 sessions were reset. This corresponds to the behaviour that had been defined
originally in RFC 4893 [18]: “To prevent the possible propagation of confederation path
segments outside of a confederation, the path segment types AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
and AS_CONFED_SET from RFC 3065 [124] are declared invalid for the AS4_PATH
attribute.”
As a response to this incident, the behaviour of a router when receiving this kind
of packets was changed in a new version of RFC 4893 [125]. The consequence of this
change was that the AS confederation information was leaked to the Internet. This
incident is analysed in more detail in Section 6.1. Furthermore, with different Internet
Service Providers using different operating systems and even different versions of the
same operating system within the network, the risk that malformed packets can induce
new routing storms is not completely banned.
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4.2.2 Error detection for optional transitive attributes: ‘treat
as withdraw’
Another attempt to treat malformed BGP-4 updates was presented to the
IETF [126]. This Internet Draft specifies the ‘treat as withdraw’ behaviour for optional
transitive attributes only and does not define any backward notification mechanism to
peers that originate or relay the incorrect information. It just requires that the peer
discovering the malformed attribute or attributes should have logging facilities to record
the offending instances. In my work, ‘treat as withdraw’ is always applied and I propose
to send error notifications to upstream peers in addition to logging the events that might
be triggered by the router detecting the error. This increases the probability of detecting
it.
4.2.3 Enhancing the inter-protocol isolation in Multiprotocol
BGP-4 environments
BGP-4 is being used as the inter-domain routing protocol of choice for
protocols other than IPv4. This has been possible with the
Multiprotocol Extension for BGP-4 (MP-BGP) specification. MP-BGP transports the
routing information of all address families over a common BGP-4 session. This results in
massive disruption to all communication when an error condition, like an invalid BGP-4
update, forces the BGP-4 session to be reset.
In the year 2005, Nalawade, Patel et al. proposed a soft notification mechanism
in case of reception of corrupted packets [127]. This proposal describes a mechanism
that allows to notify a remote peer of an error-condition or an event without resetting
or terminating the BGP-4 session. However, the proposal only provides the ability to
soft-reset for a particular AF without disrupting the other AFs carried by the BGP-4
session. The main drawback of this proposal is the complex mechanism proposed to
handle soft notification messages, which almost always results in a BGP-4 session reset.
Another strategy to overcome this problem was proposed to GROW in the IETF in
the “Multi-session BGP-4” draft [128]. Multi-session BGP-4 proposes a mechanism that
allows multiple BGP-4 sessions to exist between two BGP-4 speakers. Each isolated
BGP-4 session can then carry the routing information of a specific Address Family.
Although this approach would provide finer-grained fault management and isolation, it
would not suppress the routing storms which have occurred during 2009, because they
do not specify any way to avoid a faulty packet to be leaked into the Internet. In
my practical implementation, I go a step further and use independent daemons (and
hence protocol sessions) to isolate TE activity from the regular Internet routing tables.
However, multi-session BGP-4 would also be a valid option to transport the TE-related
routing information within the proposed architecture.
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4.3 Comparison between my work and the related
work
I present, as many other people have done, an attempt to improve BGP-4 in order to
provide a more reliable Internet. The differences between other approaches and mine,
presented in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 can be condensed in the following comparison
table:
Table 4.1: Comparison between the related work and my
proposal
Proposal Argument My answer
Drawback
Fall et al. [87] No need for table
compression, Moore’s
Law provides comput-
ing power to accom-
modate the growth of
the routing tables
Well aggregated ta-
bles reduce the risk of
misconfiguration and
the effort debugging
faulty routing tables.
Optimal Rout-
ing Table Con-
structor [88]
Use BGP-4 as is to re-
main backwards com-
patible and use ORTC
locally in the router to
reduce the FIB
Aggregating ade-
quately at the AS
level reduces BGP-4
information exchange
and helps generat-
ing well aggregated
routing tables in the
DFZ.
Suri, Sand-
holm and
Warkhede [90]
When applied to
BGP-4, this algo-
rithm generates new
aggregations in inter-
mediate ASes, leading
to potential routing
loops.
Aggregation is a
responsibility of the
ASes that advertise
prefixes to the In-
ternet and not of
intermediate ASes in
order to avoid routing
loops.
SMALTA [91] Achieves optimal FIB
compression but does
not help reducing the
size of the routing ta-
ble
Well-aggregated rout-
ing tables produce
the same benefits
as resource-intensive
FIB compression
algorithms
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the related work and my
proposal
Proposal Argument My answer
Drawback
Feamster et al. [93] Separating routing
and forwarding in dif-
ferent devices would
make intra-AS Traffic
Engineering easier
but does not address
the inter-AS TE case
and impact is on
routing table size is
not known
I address inter-AS TE
configurations and
provide an estimate of
the reduction of the
routing table size in
the DFZ
PCE [94] Specialised for MPLS
networks, introduces a
single point of fail-
ure and is tailored for
IGPs. Routes for TE
that leak into BGP-4
make the routing ta-
bles grow.
Designed for IP. Keeps
routes associated to
TE isolated from main
routing table.
VA [89] No means to avoid
de-aggregation as a
means for TE
TE tools provided
while keeping the
DFZ well aggregated.
CRIO [99] Could route intra-AS
traffic through exter-
nal ASes
Keeps intra-AS traffic
inside the AS.
NIRA [105] New packet format:
data packets carry
route specification in
the header. Severe se-
curity risks exhibited
by IP source routing
No modification in the
packet format.
NIRA [105] Disruptive, clean slate
and non backward-
compatible
Backward-compatible,
evolutionary approach
SIRA [106] Multi-homing clients
are not addressed
Architecture for
multi-homed ASes
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the related work and my
proposal
Proposal Argument My answer
Drawback
LISP [109] Transition from IPv4
to IPv6 not addressed
correctly
IP version indepen-
dent
TE for stub-
ASes [70] and
Tweak-it [55]
Does not address the
growth of the routing
tables in the DFZ
I help to aggregate the
routing tables in the
DFZ better.
4.4 BGP-4 protocol and routing storm analysis
In my work, I perform BGP-4 update sequence analysis. I observe several situations
were the update traffic is abnormally high and explore which the techniques applied by
network administrators can be identified in the BGP-4 update traffic. These results help
me identifying weak points of the protocol that I need to overcome in my architecture.
Dolev et al. study the robustness of the Internet and the BGP-4 protocol [129]. They
compare the different techniques used by ASes and conclude that BGP-4 resilient AS
interconnection is mainly achieved by multi-homing followed by the use of a main and
a backup link.
Programs crafted with malicious intent have caused disruptions in the Internet in-
frastructure. Li et al. [130] analysed these disruptions and identified patterns of BGP-4
traffic they could link with different documented attacks and were able to detect new
attacks on the Internet’s infrastructure using those patterns. Similarily, they were able
to predict the effect of natural disasters on the BGP-4 infrastructure based on previous
disruptions.
A general BGP-4 protocol security analysis was provided by Kuhn et al. in [75] for
the National Institute of Standards and Technology. In this paper, they analyse the
protocol and list the potential sources of instability that are intrinsic to it.
Li et al. study BGP-4 protocol dynamics in [131]. This study shows that in the first
decade of the 21st century, BGP-4 was more stable than previously, identifies ASes that
act as main BGP-4 traffic sources and shows that BGP-4 traffic generated by ASes is
not related with their size.
Huang et al. [132] propose a method to detect network disruptions using BGP-4
traffic, using network configuration information in addition to the BGP-4 traffic.
Zhang, Quoitin and Zhou have recently published a comparative study of the evolu-
tion of the IPv4 and IPv6 Internets [133]. They provide some insight into the evolution
of the number of ASes that are active on both networks. Since the objective of my anal-
ysis is to provide a case for an evolution of the access infrastructure to parallel routing
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architectures, my analysis of the Internet evolution has concentrated on the evolution of
the leaf ASes and their use of traffic engineering techniques like AS_PATH Prepending.
Regarding BGP-4 analysis, Khosla et al. propose to group BGP-4 updates in se-
quences they call “molecules” in order to analyse BGP-4 prefix behaviour [134]. This
work was published two years after my initial papers on Trial-and-Error Traffic Engi-
neering patterns [7].
Renesys [135] is a private company that has specialised in BGP-4 consulting. They
maintain a blog where experts analyse routing incidents, e.g., [136, 5]. I use this
information to confirm the existence of major BGP-4 events and contrast their findings
with my own.
4.5 Implementation alternatives
I have implemented a proof-of-concept of my routing architecture on a limited scale, in
order to confirm that it is implementable and reasonably safe to deploy at a minimal
scale in the Internet. This section describes the different alternatives with regards to
emulation environments, simulation environments and BGP-4 source code bases I have
considered for my work.
4.5.1 Network emulation environments
Network emulation environments provide a testbed for debugging implementations of
routing protocol suites. They are virtualised environments and provide an independent
execution environment for each emulated machine. Their main weak point is the way
they emulate network links and introducing delay or jitter as in real-world deployments
increases the amount of resources they demand from the host system.
Network emulation environments considered for my work can be grouped in two cat-
egories: emulators running locally and remote emulation testbeds. Remote emulation
testbeds like Emulab [137] in the U.S.A. or German-lab [138] provide network infras-
tructures to conduct networking experiments. By providing full control over network
nodes, experiments that imply high node load benefit from them. However, they require
an Internet connection in order to conduct the experiments and I knew that I would
not have Internet access for longer periods when performing this work. The focus of
my work was to implement the routing architecture and test the functionality, not the
performance.
Therefore, I decided to go for an emulation environment I could use locally on my
machine.
4.5.1.1 Netkit
Netkit [139] uses User-Mode Linux [140] as a virtualisation technology and runs Linux
router images based on Quagga [83] only.
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4.5.1.2 GNS3
GNS3 can use different virtualisation frameworks like QEMU [141], VirtualBox [142] to
execute guest operating systems like Linux or Windows and Dynamips [143] for selected
images of major network equipment vendors like Cisco or Juniper.
4.5.1.3 Selection of the emulation environment
I finally choseNetkit because I had prior experience with it. GNS3 is certainly attractive
because it is able to execute actual vendor operating systems, but since I introduce new
features in BGP-4, I would have needed access to the source code for these images and
this is currently not possible.
4.5.2 Open source BGP-4 implementations
In order to implement the proof-of-concept of the routing architecture I propose, I had
two possibilities:
1. implement BGP-4 from scratch. This would have meant a new development with
a significant amount in debugging in order to provide a solid implementation that
would not falsify the results.
2. reuse an existing implementation. For this purpose, there are different open
source router implementations that provide implementations of the BGP-4 pro-
tocol, which have been proven in real-word deployments.
The objective of my work is to implement an architecture that uses BGP-4 in a new
way, in order to reduce the routing table size. It has to be evolutionary and backwards
compatible. Therefore it was not necessary to re-implement BGP-4 from scratch, but
rather add the required features to an existing implementation.
Following implementations were available when I started my work:
4.5.2.1 Merit’s Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit
Merit’s Multi-threaded Routing Toolkit [78] was one of the first implementations of a
routing protocol suite that could be executed on off-the-shelf equipment. Development
ceased in the early 2000’s and it’s presence in the Web disappeared 2010. The most
significant and lasting result of this effort is the MRT binary format specification, which
is maintained and enhanced by the Global Routing Working Group (GROW) of the
IETF.
4.5.2.2 Zebra
Zebra [82] is an open-source implementation of a router supporting different routing
protocols like RIP [144], OSPF [24] and BGP-4. This routing suite uses a command-line
interface that is inspired by Cisco Systems’ command-line interface. It is implemented
using the C programming language. The last stable version of the source code was
released September of 2005.
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The Zebra routing suite is based on a central daemon (zebra) that communicates with
different daemons that implement routing protocols on one side and with the kernel
routing tables. The communication with the routing daemons is based on a simple
protocol, known as the Zebra protocol [145]. The interaction with the kernel routing
tables is implemented with the Netlink protocol. Figure 4.2 shows a block diagram of
the different components in the Zebra routing protocol suite.
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Figure 4.2: High-Level View of the Zebra/Quagga routing protocol suite on deployed on
a Linux platform
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4.5.2.3 Quagga
Quagga [83] is a fork of the Zebra routing suite. This project is currently active and has
an extended base of supported routing protocols. It has an active community of main-
tainers and developers who correct implementation errors. This code base is deployed
in many routers in the Internet, and runs on Solaris, BSD and Linux based Operating
Systems.
4.5.2.4 OpenBGPD
Zebra and Quagga have been mainly developed by the Linux and Solaris communities
and are licensed under the GPL license. This license is incompatible with the OpenBSD
operating system. A community of programmers developed a BGP-4 routing daemon
with free licensing and stressing security and robustness. This development can be
downloaded from the OpenBGPD [146] project’s website. This daemon is an indepen-
dent effort, i.e., no routing protocol suite, although the companion project OpenOSPF,
also available from the OpenBGPD site, is developing an OSPF implementation under
the same model.
4.5.2.5 XORP
The eXtensible Open Router Platform [147] is another project that is developing a router
platform that can run on commodity hardware over a number of Operating Systems. It
implements additional functionality like GRE tunnelling [103]. This routing suite has
GPL licensing and provides a command-line interface akin to the JunOS-command line
interface (CLI) [148].
4.5.2.6 The Bird Internet Routing Daemon
The Bird Internet Routing Daemon [149] is another Linux-oriented routing protocol
suite developed by the Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. It implements
multiple routing tables and has a command-line interface akin to the JUNOS CLI. This
development started 2005 and was dormant for about 4 years. The development activity
ramped up after I had already implemented a first working prototype of my parallel
routing architecture.
4.5.2.7 Selection criteria
When I planned the development, I was looking for an open source project that was
alive, provided a reliable BGP-4 implementation in a code base that could be executed
on a Linux environment. Table 4.2 shows the different strengths and weaknesses of the
examined BGP-4 implementations. Based on this table, and due to my experience in
operating Cisco network equipment, I finally chose to use Quagga.
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Table 4.2: Comparison between the different routing
suites
Routing Suite Strengths Weaknesses
MRT Very simple code Incomplete BGP-4
implementation
Old code base
Abandoned project
Zebra Complete BGP-4 im-
plementation
Closed source
Well-known develop-
ment environment
Cisco CLI
Quagga Complete BGP-4 im-
plementation
Live project, Open
Source
Well-known environ-
ment
Cisco CLI
OpenBGPD Stable code Incomplete implemen-
tation
Linux support Focusing on FreeBSD
Some experience
XORP Apparently feature
complete
Unknown environ-
ment
Live project, Open
Source
Juniper CLI
BIRD Apparently feature
complete
Unknown environ-
ment
Live project, Open
Source
Juniper CLI
4.5.3 MRT binary format parsers
I have developed the software to parse the MRT binary format files from scratch, using
the Java programming language and the reference documents circulated in the Global
Routing Working Group in the IETF. Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) provides a refer-
ence implementation of an MRT binary format parser in C [150]. When I started my
work, this implementation was not quite stable and threw exceptions when parsing IPv6
related information.
There is also an MRT format parser written in Perl by Rossi et al. The MDFMT
toolkit [151] was started after I had already worked intensively on my Java toolkit. A
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version of libbgpdump written in Python [152] was released when I started working on
my parser. It was even less mature than libbgpdump and seems to be abandoned after
it was released, since no updates have been released after January, 2007.
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Chapter5
BGP-4 Update Sequence Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter collects my work on BGP-4 update sequence analysis. This work was
published in ICNS’2009 [7], Broadnets’2009 [8] and ICNS’2010 [9].
I started this work to find traces of the activity of automatic routing optimisation
products like netVmg (integrated at least in the Internap service offering [58]) and of
human intervention on the routing infrastructure of the Internet. This work led to dis-
covering instances of instability that affected some prefixes. These instabilities or rout-
ing storms are undesired situations from the network operations point of view and are
therefore good candidates to contain update sequences that show how network operators
work to mitigate them. Using these update sequences, I could also show how the af-
fected ASes tried to route around the instability by artificially increasing the AS_PATH
length, i.e., using AS_PATH Prepending techniques. Further on, I looked at the arrival
times of updates for a prefix in general. This helped me single out cases of ASes with a
specific operations time window and develop techniques to determine this time window.
5.2 AS_PATH Prepend Sequence Analysis
The view of the Internet from one specific AS is limited and it is impossible to compute
the network paths between all possible traffic sources and destinations from the viewpoint
of a specific AS [70]. For this reason, it is also impossible to predict accurately how
a routing configuration applied in an AS will affect the overall routing behaviour in
the Internet. Therefore, the routing policies that translate into routing configurations
at the AS-level are applied on a trial-and-error basis: based on current conditions, a
policy is designed and applied and the resulting traffic profiles are observed. If the
expected traffic profile is not met after allowing the routing a certain time to settle,
the policies are changed [57]. This operational procedure applied by an AS that uses
AS_PATH Prepending to control its inbound traffic can be observed from the outside
as a sequence of updates for certain prefixes that are sent every time the routing policies
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are modified. The AS_PATH attribute in these updates will have fluctuating length,
depending on how many times the Autonomous System Number is prepended. When
using AS_PATH Prepending to control the traffic, an AS will withdraw a prefix from
the Internet under the following conditions:
• when a policy leads to an unintended routing configuration and needs to be re-
moved
• when the prefix is not needed for a given configuration
• when a prefix has been reassigned to another AS
The first two conditions normally lead to unwanted traffic distributions in the inter-
domain links.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of the use of AS_PATH Prepending by leaf ASes
AS_PATH Prepending is presented in all BGP-4 reference manuals (e.g., [40, 153,
36]). It significantly contributes to the growth of the Internet’s routing tables [39]. Fig-
ure 5.1 shows that more than 60% of the leaf ASes were using
AS_PATH Prepending in the period between 2001 and 2011. These data were ex-
tracted from DFZ routing tables contributed to the RIPE RR by two collectors that
were active during that period. This figure shows the lower bound for the actual use
of AS_PATH Prepending, because the BGP-4 route decision mechanisms selects adver-
tisements with the shortest AS_PATH and might have suppressed advertisements with
AS_PATH Prepending.
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5.2.1 Side-effects of Traffic Engineering
The Internet is an eco-system of collaborating and yet competing ISPs. When applying
the aforementioned techniques in the Internet, conflicts between ISPs will arise. These
conflicts trigger advertisements and counter-advertisements as each AS acts in its own
interest trying to neutralise the negative impact of a foreign policy change and to opti-
mise the utilisation of its resources [154, 155].
The response of the BGP-4 protocol introduces additional complexity to the problem.
As observed by T. Griffin in RFC 4264 [156], the behaviour of BGP-4 is not completely
stable and there are interactions between routing policies in interconnected autonomous
systems which lead to unpredictable responses, which can not be debugged. They are
discovered by a network operator, but he is not able to manipulate the network to make
it return to the expected state, neither by changing the policies used by BGP-4 in his
AS nor by other more drastic means like disabling and re-enabling an interface Even in
the absence of these interactions, Bush and Griffin [157] show that due to the timing
mechanisms in BGP-4, a stimulus consisting of a single advertisement in a simple net-
work with several ASes may trigger different BGP-4 update exchange sequences between
the ASes until the system settles. In fact, Griffin et al. demonstrate, that the effect
of applying routing policies on the configuration of the BGP-4 protocol in a router is
non-deterministic and may lead to unpredictable network states [54]. They demonstrate
that policies render the BGP-4 protocol metastable. This means that under some cir-
cumstances, BGP-4 will oscillate, producing so-called routing storms. Routing storms
are characterised by abnormally high update traffic and impact the experienced QoS.
Therefore, network operators will need to eliminate them. They are good candidates to
find BGP-4 update sequences that show how this is done.
Additionally, there is debate regarding route flap dampening in RFC 2439. Route flap
dampening has caused major disruption in the Internet [157]. It is generally accepted
as being harmful [158] and has been deprecated by RIPE [159] because it can further
destabilise the network. Despite this, some BGP-4 speakers in the Internet continue to
use it. All these effects have to be taken into account when analysing BGP-4 update
traffic stored in the RIPE RR or other repositories.
5.2.2 Preselection Algorithm for BGP-4 Update Sequences
The overall objective of my work is to propose an architecture that decouples routing
policies from the global BGP-4 routing infrastructure. By doing so, the main routing
infrastructure uses a policy-free and, therefore, stable and deterministic BGP-4 [54]. My
study of BGP-4 update sequences was aimed at sequences that can be linked to different
mechanisms used to implement Traffic Engineering using BGP-4. Once identified, I
could integrate these techniques into the architecture in a way that does not affect the
stability of the Internet’s BGP-4 routing plane.
I started by examining sequences of BGP-4 updates referring to a specific prefix that
arrive at the RIPE RR and always follow the same path. In order to simplify, I use the
term Canonical AS_PATH for the sequence of ASes traversed by an update:
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Definition 8 The Canonical AS_PATH is the sequence of ASes traversed by an
advertisement. It can be derived from the AS_PATH attribute by removing all duplicated
ASes from it (see Figure 5.2).
100 100 100 321 808 808
100 321 808
AS_PATH
Canonical AS_PATH
Figure 5.2: Relationship between AS_PATH and Canonical AS_PATH
The sequences of advertisements I studied share the same
Canonical AS_PATH but have fluctuating AS_PATH. These sequences show what
prepending policies are used by the ASes during the lifespan of the sequence. As Fig-
ure 5.3 shows in a simple example, sequences where AS_PATH Prepending cause a
change in the Canonical AS_PATH do not yield any information regarding the routing
policies.
AS1
AS2 AS3
AS4
AS5
Policy in
link AS1-AS4
no prepend
prepend by 2
AS_PATH in
Route Repository
AS1-AS4-AS5
AS1-AS2-AS3-AS5
Policy in 
link AS1-AS2
no prepend
no prepend
Route
Repository
Figure 5.3: Change in AS_PATH Prepending policy that is not reflected in the
AS_PATH stored in a route repository
In order to fulfil the requirement of arriving through the same path to the RIPE RR,
the sequences of BGP-4 updates I filtered out for study have the following characteristics:
• they refer to the same prefix
• they are contributed by the peer to the RIPE RR,
54
5.2. AS_PATH Prepend Sequence Analysis
• they are consecutive in time, and
• they are
– advertisements with the same Canonical AS_PATH, or
– withdraws
The advertisements contain information about the different policies applied by the
ASes along the path. The withdraws are originated by events like:
• routes that were manually withdrawn
• oscillating routes that were put on hold by route flap dampening as defined in
RFC 2439.
• policy changes that were applied to the network and activated by the soft recon-
figuration mechanism [61]
All these events are significant when trying to understand the mechanisms involved
in network management and their impact on the Internet’s routing tables. In order
to make the new architecture more likely to be accepted by the network management
community, these mechanisms need to be mapped into my proposal.
Figure 5.4 shows the sequence detector I used. It is implemented by a BGP-4 up-
date sequencer shown in Algorithm 1 followed by an evaluator, that narrows down the
characteristics of the BGP-4 sequences kept for further analysis.
Filtering &
sorting
Sequencing Evalutator
BGP-4 
Update
files
Trial & Error
candidate
sequences
Figure 5.4: Sequence detector: logical blocks
The evaluator I have used for all my published work is shown in Algorithm 2. It
flags BGP-4 update sequences that have two or more advertisements with different
AS_PATH length. With this evaluator, I get rid of sequences where the AS_PATH
does not fluctuate, because no information of the AS_PATH Prepending policies can
be obtained from them. Additionally, it includes an inter-arrival time threshold. This
threshold helps filtering out different phenomena. For instance, implementations of the
Route Refresh Capability [60] are based on sending a withdraw and a new advertisement
for the routes that need to be refreshed in the same BGP-4 update or very close in time;
when a route oscillates, the interval between routing updates is influenced by the protocol
timers; finally, when an operator or a machine applies policies, the time between two
consecutive updates tends to be several times the BGP-4 protocol timers. Table 5.1
shows the threshold values used depending on which phenomenon needs to be analysed.
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Table 5.1: Threshold ranges used to analyse different
phenomena
Threshold interval Phenomenon under study
0 s to 5 s Route refresh capability
15 s to 1 min BGP-4 protocol timers
5 min or more Network maintenance or network man-
agement (e.g., traffic engineering, etc.)
Data: all updates collected by a specific device during a time window [t0,t1]
Sort by prefix, peer and time in this order;
foreach prefix do
foreach peer do
canonical_as_path← ∅;
collector ← ∅;
foreach update do
/* skip all withdraws at the beginning */
if canonical_as_path == ∅ then
if IsAdvertisement(update) then
canonical_as_path← getCano(update);
if collector == ∅ ∥
/* get all withdraws and updates sharing the canonical path
*/
IsWithdraw(update) ∥
getCano(update) == canonical_as_path then
collector ← collector ∪ update;
else
/* when the canonical path changes, evaluate what you
collected */
evaluate(collector);
/* and start all over again */
collector ← update;
canonical_as_path← getCano(update);
Algorithm 1: The AS_PATH Prepending sequencer
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Data: a candidate update sequence
Data: ∆tmin
Result: true if candidate is Trial and Error Traffic
Engineering (Trial and Error TE)
fluctuated← false;
adv_counter ← 0;
last_aspath← ∅;
last_TS ← 0;
foreach update in candidate do
if IsAdvertisement(update) then
adv_counter ← adv_counter + 1;
if last_aspath ̸= ∅ then
if last_aspath ̸=getASPath(update) then
fluctuated← true;
last_aspath←getASPath(update);
if ∆tmin > 0 then
/* Take into account a minimum threshold for the sequence
interarrival time. If the Route Refresh Capability is
activated, a withdraw and an advertisement might arrive
at the same time. */
if last_TS ̸= 0 and last_TS ̸=TimeStamp(update) then
if TimeStamp(update)−last_TS < ∆tmin then
/* Inter-arrival time out of range. */
return false
last_TS ← TimeStamp(update);
return fluctuated == true and adv_counter > 2
Algorithm 2: The basic AS_PATH Prepending evaluator
5.2.3 Traffic Engineering with BGP-4: Defensive AS_PATH
Prepending
In order to test the detection algorithm with the simple evaluator, I took the data
collected by the RR from peers in the London Internet Exchange (LINX) during May
2007. This selection was motivated because there are publicly available traffic profiles
for that particular month [160]. These traffic profiles clearly show a period of high and
a period of low data traffic. The period of low traffic is also known as off-peak hour.
During May 2007, the off-peak hour was during the early morning, i.e., from 04:00 to
08:00 local time. The off-peak hour is optimally suited for network maintenance because
the impact on customers is minimised. This time window was my first target when
looking for traces of maintenance operations in the RIPE RR.
I divided the data sets in time windows of 4 hours, i.e., the duration of the off-peak
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period, starting at 00:00 GMT. The six resulting time windows approximately cover the
off-peak period in the different time zones: for South America it is four hours earlier
than in Europe, the US east coast it is shifted 6 hours, the west coast is shifted between
8 and 9 hours, and the Asia/Pacific rim, taking Tokyo as a reference, is shifted 8 hours
later than the US west coast.
I used a five minute bin to count the number of updates. This bin corresponds to
the time window stored in each of the update files in the RRs. It is also used by major
vendors to collect long trend statistics in network equipment [153] and allowed me to
compare the routing data with traffic data sampled with the same frequency.
Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the number of BGP-4 updates per 5 minute bin
detected by the BGP-4 update selection algorithm. It superimposes the graphs for all
days of the month. In the time window between 00:00 GMT and 04:00 GMT, sustained
activity with sporadic larger peaks can be observed. This activity corresponds to activity
in Europe, because the prefixes involved in it were assigned in that period of time to
European ASes.
Significant peaks in the most active bin are detected in the time window between
04:00 GMT and 08:00 GMT, shown in Figure 5.5b. With the exception of these peaks,
the activity for this time window can be traced back to operations in South America.
The activity in the next time window, shown in Figure 5.5c, can be linked to operations
in North America. The next time window shows relatively low activity. The last two
time windows show some more activity.
Uhlig et al. measure a background traffic of around 100 updates per minute as EGP
sustained traffic in the traces they use for their outbound TE system for stub ASes [70].
It must be noted that this figure represents the total number of updates per minute
in one AS. The figures presented here only take into account sequences which the TE
detector has selected but contain the BGP-4 traffic from all the ASes which contribute
to the LINX. Uhlig’s measurements are confirmed in Figure 5.6. When taking the
number of updates per bin on for a specific point in time, the upper end of the 95%
confidence interval for the samples during May 2007 stays below 500 BGP-4 updates per
bin, i.e., the 100 updates per minute figure measured by Uhlig. Only Figure 5.6e has
larger periods of time where this does not happen. This result shows that applying the
BGP-4 update selection algorithm blindly on data stored in a BGP-4 routing repository
helps detecting abnormal situations.
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The algorithm proves to be very efficient when analysing a limited set of prefixes.
This scenario represents the use case of an Autonomous System checking how the pre-
fixes it advertises are seen in the Internet. The peaks shown in Figures 5.5b and 5.5c
can be dated to the 29 of May, 2007, as confirmed in the peaks on the mean BGP-4
traffic in Figures 5.6b and 5.6c. I collected the prefixes involved in the peaks from the
update sequences that yielded Figure 5.5 and applied the sequence detection algorithm
to advertisements involving this set of prefixes only. The result is shown in Figure 5.7. It
shows that these prefixes produced a significant amount of BGP-4 traffic in a delimited
time window. The peak traffic is two orders of magnitude above Uhlig’s average BGP-4
traffic for 100 updates/min or 500 updates per bin.
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Figure 5.7: Profile for the 29 of May, 2007 for the subset of prefixes involved in the
outlier
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In order to further evaluate this traffic peak, I studied the traffic contributed by peer
202.12.28.190 to traffic collector RRC00 of the RIPE RR the day after, i.e., the 30 of
May, 2007. Figure 5.8 shows the frequencies of the count of updates per 5 minute bin.
The distribution is skewed with regards to a normal distribution. Different alternative
distributions were tested with GNU-R [161]. Listing 5.1 shows that the hypothesis of a
logarithmic normal distribution for the BGP-4 traffic cannot be rejected (p > 0.05).
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Figure 5.8: Frequency distribution of the BGP-4 traffic
Listing 5.1: GNU-R fit to a log-normal of the BGP-4 traffic
> summary(total)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
76.0 182.5 254.0 328.6 413.2 1694.0
> summary(log(total))
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
4.331 5.207 5.537 5.607 6.024 7.435
> fitdistr(total ,"log -normal ")
meanlog sdlog
5.60652164 0.59046248
(0.03479334) (0.02460260)
> ml<-mean(log(total))
> sdl <-sd(log(total ))
> ks.test(total ," plnorm",meanlog=ml,sdlog=sdl)
One -sample Kolmogorov -Smirnov test
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data: total
D = 0.0562 , p-value = 0.3225
alternative hypothesis: two -sided
Additionally, I also studied the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (eCDF)
of the number of updates per bin contributed by 202.12.28.190 during May of 2007. This
function is shown in Figure 5.9. It shows that the probability of the number of updates
in a bin being 1000 or more is very small. Table 5.2 shows that the probability that
more than 3000 updates were collected during a time bin is very low. Therefore, the
peaks in Figure 5.11 can be considered outliers.
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Figure 5.9: ECDF of the number of updates per bin
Table 5.2: Probability of collecting a large number of
updates in a time bin
N (Updates per bin) p(n < N)
3000 0.003360
4000 0.001680
5000 0.001008
6000 0.000896
7000 0.000784
8000 0.000672
9000 0.000560
10000 0.000448
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Figure 5.11 shows a 3D expansion of Figure 5.7. I was obtained by sorting the
advertisements by the length of their AS_PATH attribute. One axis represents the time
of the day, another the length of the AS_PATH attribute, and the third the number
of updates per bin. The graphs are drawn for a fixed AS_PATH length. The graph
for AS_PATH length 0 shows the number of withdraws and the graph for AS_PATH
length 18 shows the total number of updates collected for the set of prefixes under study.
Figure 5.10 shows the same graph projected on the xy plane. This gives a better
view of the periods of time where advertisements with a given AS_PATH length could
be observed. The horizontal lines in the graph delimit the period of time with unusually
high activity.
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Figure 5.10: Different AS_PATH lengths in time
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From both figures we see that
1. the event produces the highest number of updates for AS_PATHs attributes with
lengths 4 and 6. The graphs follow the profile of the aggregated traffic. Figure 5.12
shows that they account for approximately 70% of the events.
2. AS_PATH lengths shorter or equal to 9 and with lengths 10 and 11 are present
during the whole observation period or appear very much in advance with respect
to the period of maximum activity. Except for the above mentioned lengths 4 and
6, the traffic is not very significant.
3. AS_PATH lengths 12, 15, 16 and 17 appear after the activity ramps up. As shown
further down, they are used to assign unstable paths a very low priority. They
show an attempt to divert the incoming traffic to paths that are more stable, in
the hope that the AS_PATH attribute with which they are advertised is shorter
than the AS_PATH of the unstable path.
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Figure 5.12: AS_PATH lengths frequency distribution, during and after the storm
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show the frequencies of the lengths of the AS_PATH
attribute and the Canonical AS_PATH, respectively. Figure 5.13 shows that ASes which
are 4 hops away (i.e., Canonical AS_PATH length is 4) account for more than 80% of
the events, whereas the rest of the days the activity is mainly distributed among ASes
that are between 3 and 5 hops away. The advertisements need to be further analysed to
detect the source of the instability.
Figure 5.12 shows that the AS_PATH length fluctuates between 2 and 8. The day
of the incident, the distribution has two main peaks at when AS_PATH length is 4
or 6 and two additional peaks for when the AS_PATH length is 14 and 16. The first
two peaks together show that most instabilities result from ASes in the path which
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Figure 5.13: Canonical AS_PATH probability before, during and after the storm
toggle between announcing without AS_PATH Prepending and prepending by 2. This
behaviour is also reflected in the beginning of the sequences shown in Listing 5.2. The
other two peaks result from AS14 prepending by 10, in order to reduce the preference
of the path.
Defensive AS_PATH Prepending can be explained as follows: ASes prefer stable
paths because the QoS parameters stay within predictable limits [162]. Stable paths
also reduce the risk of processor overload in the routers as a consequence of continuous
path computations. Therefore, AS administrators fine-tune the routing policies they
deploy, making unstable paths less preferable than stable paths. This is achieved by
making unstable paths artificially longer than stable paths using AS_PATH Prepending.
The amount of prepending introduced on the advertisements has to guarantee that the
unstable path will be always appear longer than any stable alternative.
Listing 5.2: Defensive AS_PATH Prepending: anonymized advertisements for a specific
prefix received in the RIPE RR
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14|...
...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14|...
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...|A|...|7 2 51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14|...
...|A|...|7 2 51 51 51 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14|...
...
Listing 5.2 shows an excerpt of the output of the analysis program. All records
correspond to the same prefix. The ’|A|’ field indicates that the BGP-4 updates were
advertisements. Autonomous System Numbers in the AS_PATH attribute have been
changed in order to provide some level of anonymity. It shows an update group where
AS51 is oscillating and an update group that exhibits a defensive AS_PATH Prepending
pattern. The source of instability is AS51. It is toggling between advertisements without
AS_PATH Prepending and advertisements prepended by 2. The end of the sequence
corresponds to AS14 entering defensive mode: it starts to prepend by 10, in order to
make this path less preferable compared to other, more stable paths. This behaviour
explains the peaks for AS_PATH lengths 14 and 16 in Figure 5.12 the day of the
incident. The day after, a fraction of the updates still have an AS_PATH length of 14.
They correspond to ISPs which prefer to maintain the defensive re-routing until there
is a reasonable level of certainty that the path is stable again.
Table 5.3: AS_PATH Prepending behaviour (excerpt 1 of 2)
AS fake hops before during after
14 10 2 258 30
16 4 1120
16 5 1043
51 2 6 2818 37
Table 5.4: AS_PATH Prepending behaviour (excerpt 2 of 2)
AS fake hops before during after
11 2 3
11 3 98 108 95
11 4 20 15 3
60 1 2 2
60 2 12 22 13
60 3 115 156 130
60 4 127 178 142
67 3 91 67 60
67 6 60 32 37
Finally, the AS_PATH Prepending behaviour of all ASes was studied.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show excerpts of the full result. Table 5.3 shows Autonomous Sys-
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tems that behave depending on whether the BGP-4 update traffic is low or high. Only
one Autonomous System (AS14) is applying defensive AS_PATH Prepending during
and after the incident by introducing 10 fake hops into the AS_PATH. Two additional
Autonomous Systems are involved in significant activity: AS51 introduces 2 fake hops
in a significant amount of events and AS16 toggles between introducing 4 and 5 fake
hops.
Table 5.4 shows ASes that use the same policies when the BGP-4 update traffic is
low and when it is high. AS11 mainly prepends by 3 and 4, AS60 has policies which
prepend by 2, 3 and 4 and AS67 consistently prepends by 3 and 6. The fact that AS11
starts prepend by 2 and that AS60 starts prepending by one can be considered a result
of the increase in BGP-4 traffic.
5.3 Studying Provider Behaviour
As explained in Section 3.1.2, ISPs sign extensive interconnection contracts, which in-
clude SLAs. In some cases, these SLAs define acceptable service time windows, where
invasive network maintenance can be performed. These time windows normally occur
when the impact on the end-user Quality of Experience (QoE) of such maintenance oper-
ations is minimal. Network maintenance involves either changes in the physical network
or changes in its routing configuration. Both cases trigger BGP-4 update traffic while
BGP-4 copes with them. Since BGP-4 tries to optimise traffic by grouping prefixes with
the same attributes into updates, studying BGP-4 update traffic may be inconclusive for
purposes like SLA dispute. The tools I have developed to understand how ISPs operate
their networks are finer grained and use the prefix information contained in the BGP-4
updates.
5.3.1 Update arrival time distribution
In order to understand the behaviour of a prefix over time, historical BGP-4 data are
needed. These data can come from public routing repositories, like RIPE’s Routing
Repository [3] or the Oregon Routeviews project [76] or from one or more private routing
repositories installed by Internet Service Provider in their infrastructures.
The method I propose to analyse the prefix activity and relate it to the operation
policy of a provider is to
1. select the update traffic files for the period under study
2. select the updates related to the prefix under study, and
3. to compute and plot the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of the prefix
update arrival time-of-day, and
4. compare with information from other sources like the Internet Routing Registries
I then complement this analysis with information about the geographical location
and the nature of the AS provider coming from other sources like the Internet Routing
Registries, to put the results in perspective.
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Figure 5.14: Idealised update arrival time CDF
Figure 5.14 shows a simple idealised Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for
update arrival times with three specific time windows. In all three time windows, the
distribution of arrival times is uniform. The slopes m1,m2 and m3 denote different levels
of activity and are proportional to the arrival frequency in the specific time interval. In
the case of Figure 5.14, the interval of maximum activity is t ∈ {t1, t2}. In order to
minimise the impact of network operations on their customers, some network operators
define operation windows, where manipulations on the network are allowed [163, 164].
There are two extreme cases, from a mere Operations & Management point of view:
• No operations time window: the prefix is updated randomly at any time of the
day.
• Well defined operations time window: the prefix is only updated during one or
more well-defined time intervals; in the latter case, the number of intervals is
usually small.
Even if the SLA signed with a client does not include maintenance time windows, the
operator may choose to restrict operations to specific time windows in order to protect
network integrity, the SLAs signed with other clients, etc.
5.3.1.1 No predefined operations window
When an AS has no predefined operations time window, updates will be distributed
uniformly during the whole day. The empirical Cumulative Distribution Function will
be close to the diagonal line starting at probability 0 at time 0:00 and ending at proba-
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bility 1.00 at time 24:00. This reference line is shown in Figure 5.14 and in all graphics
in this paper. It gives a visual reference for the deviation from this uniformly random
behaviour.
5.3.1.2 Well-defined operations window
When all updates occur in a well-defined operations window t ∈ {t1, t2}, the curve will
have two horizontal segments for t < t1 and t > t2. Supposing, again, that the events
will be uniformly distributed during the operations window, the central segment will
be a straight line between (t1, 0.00) and (t2, 1.00). Figure 5.14 shows a more realistic
situation, where a small fraction of the events arrive before and after the operations
window, while the majority arrives in the operations window (t1, t2).
5.3.2 Analysis of AS behaviour
Figure 5.15 shows the behaviour for different prefixes as recorded by RIPE RR at the
London Internet Exchange (LINX) during 2007. In order to provide a better insight,
the BGP-4 updates were classified into four different categories:
1. Prefix withdraws
2. Prefix advertisement without prepending
3. Prefix advertisement with prepending by the originating AS
4. Prefix advertisement with prepending by other ASes in the AS_PATH
The relation between four categories determines the impact of local and foreign
policies on the path between the originating AS and the routing repository that is used
as reference point.
5.3.2.1 Uniform distribution
Figure 5.15a shows a prefix that exhibits a nearly uniform distribution for all four cat-
egories. Using GNU-R [161] to analyse the arrival time series, Pearson’s Chi-squared
test was applied to the daily arrival times of the four categories. Each time series was
compared with a uniformly distributed distribution for t ∈ {0s, 86400s} with the same
number of samples. As shown in Table 5.5, all p-values are greater than 0.05, which
means that the approximation by a uniform distribution is plausible.
Distribution p-value
Without AS_PATH Prepending 0.2689
AS_PATH Prepending by originating AS 0.2724
AS_PATH Prepending by others 0.2799
Prefix withdraws 0.2851
Table 5.5: Statistical analysis for Figure 5.15a
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Figure 5.15: Behaviour of different prefixes during 2007
The fact that all empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions are approximately
uniform points towards a prefix which is not subject to any form of maintenance. All
advertisements and withdraws occur at random as the result of protocol interactions.
5.3.2.2 Wide operations window
Figure 5.15b shows the behaviour of a prefix which has an operations window of 14 hours,
approximately between 06:00 UTC and 20:00 UTC. These values were obtained with the
regression utilities of GNU-R. Additionally, the different update categories were matched
against comparable uniform distributions between the same times. Table 5.6 confirms
that the hypothesis of a uniform distribution cannot be rejected because the p-values
are significantly high (p > 0.05). In this case, the main contributors to AS activity are
Advertisements without AS_PATH Prepending, Advertisements where the originating
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AS is prepending and Withdraws. There is only a small amount of Advertisements
with AS_PATH Prepending by ASes other than the originator and therefore, these
were excluded. This analysis confirms that the activity recorded by the RIPE RR is
originated in the AS that had been assigned the prefix during the period of time under
study.
Distribution p-value
Without AS_PATH Prepending 0.2842
AS_PATH Prepending by originating AS 0.2796
Prefix withdraws 0.2579
Table 5.6: Statistical analysis for Figure 5.15b
Listing 5.3: whois information for 78.141.192.0/21
route: 78.141.192.0/21
descr: FON Wireless Autonomous System
Network
origin: AS43636
mnt -by: FON -NET -MNT
address: FON Wireless LTD
address: Avda. Bruselas 7.
address: 28108 Alcobendas
address: Madrid. Spain
Listing 5.3 shows the whois [165] information about the prefix under study. Its
profile, shown in Figure 5.15b, is compatible with the following facts about this AS:
1. The AS is located in Spain, which uses the CET/CEST timezone (UTC+1h in
winter and UTC+2h in summer). The time window shown in Figure 5.15b cov-
ers office hours in Madrid (compare with http://www.ripe.net/projects/ris/
rawdata.html [80] for average office hours in Amsterdam, which lies in the same
timezone).
2. The clients of this AS are residential customers, which will make most interactive
use of its connectivity in the time window between 20:00 UTC and 06:00 UTC.
Outside this period of time, the impact of the QoS on the Quality of Experience
is not as significant, since the users are not using their Internet connection in-
teractively i.e., Web surfing, but rather for background tasks which they pay less
attention to like p2p file exchange.
3. The network operators tend to operate the network during their work hours and do
not need to program operations during night hours like in the case of ISPs which
have a significant number of business customers.
The fact that nearly all updates are originated by policies deployed by the originating
AS strengthens the hypothesis that the BGP-4 traffic is linked with operations of the
originating AS.
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5.3.2.3 Narrow operations window
Using the generalised method to detect BGP-4 sequences that can be traced back to
network operation presented in the previous section, I applied the “Soft Session Restart”
detection and “Large Update Inter-arrival Times” heuristics for further analysis. Both
help discriminating between sequences that are triggered by external, intelligent entities
and mere protocol interaction. They take advantage of the fact that a deployment-
observation-refinement cycle for TE purposes is affected by the convergence time of the
routing protocol.
The heuristic to select sequences with large inter-arrival times (∆t > 4min) returned
several positives from prefix 12.160.186.0/24 during 2007. Browsing the RIPE RR for
updates originated by 12.160.186.0/24 during that year reveals that the prefix only
used AS_PATH Prepending between March and May of that year. Figure 5.15c shows
its behaviour during that period. It exhibits a well defined and narrow window be-
tween 02:00 UTC and 04:00 UTC for AS_PATH Prepending by the originating AS,
where more than 80% of the updates appear. This behaviour is confirmed by the
empirical Cumulative Distribution Function for the behaviour of this prefix during whole
year shown in Figure 5.15d. Examining Figure 5.15d, prefixes without
AS_PATH Prepending show a small window of activity at the same times. This window
confirms that between March and May 2007, the activity of the AS mainly consisted
in sequences interlacing advertisements without AS_PATH Prepending and advertise-
ments with AS_PATH Prepending by the originating AS. During the rest of the year,
the advertisements without AS_PATH Prepending are randomly distributed. The curve
for the updates were other ASes are prepending is inconclusive in both cases because of
the small number of events.
Listing 5.4: WHOIS information for AS21703
> whois 12.160.186.0
AT&T WorldNet Services ATT (NET -12-0-0-0-1)
12.0.0.0 - 12.255.255.255
NETWORKS AND MORE NETWORKS75 -186
(NET -12 -160 -186 -0 -1)
12.160.186.0 - 12.160.186.255
> whois AS21703
OrgName: Networks \& More! Inc.
OrgID: NETWOR -390
Address: 24 Highland Bend
City: Island Heights
StateProv: NJ
PostalCode: 08732
Country: US
Listing 5.4 shows the information provided by the whois service for the prefix and
AS. It confirms that the prefix is allocated to “Networks & More Inc.”. This provider is
located on the Atlantic coast of the United States of America. Translating CET to EST,
the time window for the AS_PATH Prepending activity shown in Figure 5.15c translates
to a time window between 10:00pm and 12:00pm. The main activity of this provider,
as stated in its Web page [166], is to provide enhanced connectivity to schools, public
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libraries and similar institutions. Therefore, the observed time window is compatible
with network maintenance operations, since the potential impact on QoS would not be
perceived by customers.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that it is possible to trace operative procedures on the
Internet. I have used publicly available data to show how the routing tables in the
Default Free Zone are inflated by additional routing entries that are used either for
Traffic Engineering purposes or as self-defence against unstable routing information.
In the next chapter, I examine two major routing storms that happened in 2009.
These routing storms are rooted in the definition of the BGP-4 protocol and how it
treats malformed BGP-4 updates. I use the results from both chapters to propose an
alternate behaviour for BGP-4 in my alternate Internet routing architecture.
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The standardisation process followed by the IETF allows an evolution model that
accommodates quickly to changes. This is achieved by introducing incremental changes
or enhancements on protocol definitions and maintaining backward compatibility. One
example is the Multiprotocol Extension for BGP-4 specification [167], which enables the
introduction of new services like MPLS-VPN [104] and the migration from IPv4 to
IPv6 [168]. Introducing IPv6 has been necessary, because the address space in IPv4 is
near exhaustion: the success of the Internet has been such, that a 32-bit host identifier
not enough to identify all devices that connect to it. To cope with this problem, a new
version IP with 128-bit long address fields is being deployed.
Something similar is happening at the Internet Service Provider (ISP) level. The
original BGP-4 definition in RFC 1654 foresaw unsigned 16-bit Autonomous System
Numbers (ASNs) to identify the different ISPs in the Internet. Foreseeing a depletion
to the ASN space, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) extended the ASN
field to 32 bits in November 2006 and, currently, 32-bit ASNs are being allocated to new
ISPs. There are some residual allocations of 16-bit ASNs and the final exhaustion date
of the 16-bit ASN address space has been predicted for 2013, as shown in G. Houston’s
ASN analysis page http://www.potaroo.net [17]. The way these 32-bit ASNs are to
be handled by BGP-4 is specified in RFC 4893 [18]. Since the number all network
elements in the Internet are affected by this change, RFC 4893 opts for the coexistence
of 2-byte and 4-byte ASNs and proposes the use of new BGP-4 attributes to carry 4-byte
ASNs, that are ignored by legacy equipment. This ensures interworking between new
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equipment that needs to be deployed in ASes that are assigned 4-byte ASNs and legacy
equipment that only understands 2-byte ASNs. One of the attributes that is impacted
by the new 4-byte ASNs is the AS_PATH attribute. In order to propagate AS_PATHs
with 4-byte ASNs through Autonomous Systems that are not prepared for 4-byte ASNs,
the AS4_PATH was introduced.
This chapter analyses two routing storms that can be traced back to software prob-
lems with coping with the AS4_PATH attribute. It is based on work I have published
in the The Sixth International Conference on Networking and Services [10].
6.1 Routing incidents linked to 4-byte ASNs
Autonomous System Confederations were originally defined in RFC 1965 [169]1. They
are used to provide better scalability to BGP-4 and a smooth transition period during
ISP mergers. An AS Confederation hides the topology of a region composed of ASes
in the Internet and makes it appear as a single AS. The part of the AS_PATH that
describes the path followed by an advertisement within a confederation is coded in
specific AS_PATH segments known as AS_CONFED_SEQ and AS_CONFED_SET.
These segments must be substituted with the ASN for the AS Confederation when the
advertisement leaves it. While this is clearly defined for the case of the AS_PATH
attribute, the situation in the case of the AS4_PATH is ambiguous.
RFC 4893 prohibits the AS_CONFED_SEQ and AS_CONFED_SET segments in
the AS4_PATH. The first routing storm of 2009 was caused by a router that started
breaking this rule, as described by Watanabe [6] in a talk at the IRS in 2009. This
routing storm was caused by a BGP-4 speaker that started leaking AS_CONFED_SEQ
segments in some announcements. Its peer implemented RFC 4893 literally and marked
those advertisements as illegal. As a consequence, and following RFC 4271, it restarted
the BGP-4 session. When the session was reestablished, the advertising peer sent the
“wrong” AS_CONFED_SEQ segments again and provoked an oscillation. Apparently,
as Watanabe describes in his presentation, the illegal advertisements were leaked to other
BGP-4 sessions. An avalanche effect reinforced the routing storm. In order to avoid this
problem, equipment manufacturers started to silently suppress the AS_CONFED_SEQ
or AS_CONFED_SET segments in AS4_PATH attributes. But this has not solved the
problem completely. However, this way of solving the problem has had a side-effect.
Some AS Confederations that are in the process of transitioning to 4-byte ASNs may
leak routing information that partially reveals their internal topology as I showed in [10].
Softening the rules on how to treat AS Confederation segments has not avoided
further routing storms linked with the AS4_PATH attribute. In August 2009, a second
major routing storm occurred. The best root-cause analysis for this storm is presented
by the Renesys routing blog [5]. It confirms the storm was caused by a malformed
AS4_PATH attribute. This blog entry identifies CNCI (AS9354) as the AS that started
the incident, confirms that the cause was the presence of BGP-4 updates that contained
1The currently active RFC is RFC 5065 [170]
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an empty AS4_PATH attribute, and presents a graph of the BGP-4 update traffic
variation induced by the storm.
6.1.1 RFC4893 violations revealing internal AS Confederation
structure
Analysing data related with this incident, I discovered that the 17tha nd the 18th of
August, 2009 the collector associated with AS13237 in the LINX of the RIPE RR con-
tributed BGP-4 updates violating RFC 4893. Further analysis of this data revealed
that this AS is an Autonomous System Confederation and exposed its internal config-
uration partially. Figure 6.1 shows the evolution in time of count of updates violating
RFC 4893 and its linear regression fit calculated with the fitting function of GNU-Plot
(see Table 6.1). Since the asymptotic standard error for the slope is very small, the
linear approximation is plausible. The slope is expressed in RFC 4893 violations per
hour, which translates into a frequency of
f =
4.62
3600s
≈ 1
780s
or a bogus update injected by the peer every 780 seconds during the period of obser-
vation. These bogus updates may lead to routing information loss or BGP-4 session
tear-downs [6].
Table 6.1: Linear fit provided by GNU-Plot
linear fit: y = m*x + b
m 4.615 +/- 0.033 0.71%
b -3.614 +/- 0.924 25.56%
By inspecting the AS4_PATH attribute of the bogus updates, topological informa-
tion from inside the AS Confederation could be obtained. Listing 6.1 shows an ex-
cerpt of the output of my analysis software. It clearly shows that AS13237 was not
replacing its AS Confederation information when sending the information to the col-
lector. Additionally, this listing shows that it has chosen to use private Autonomous
System Numbers in the confederation. Figure 6.2 shows the partial routing tree inside
AS13237 revealed by the bogus AS4_PATH attributes during the observation period.
It includes the ASes in the confederation and the first hop behind them. It shows the
internal structure of AS13237 with some level of detail, like the multi-homing relation-
ships with AS1299, AS16150, AS9002 and AS174. This level of detail is normally hidden
by the AS Confederation and only appears in the incorrect AS4_PATH attribute. This
level of detail can neither be reached when RFC 4893 is implemented correctly and the
AS_PATH attribute is the only source of information.
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Figure 6.1: RFC 4893 violations during the 17th and 18th of August, 2009
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Figure 6.2: AS Confederation topology revealed by the bogus BGP-4 updates
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Listing 6.1: RFC4893 violations detected with my analysis software (excerpt)
RFC4893 violation @ 1250489010 from (AS13237 ;195.66.224.99)
with AS4PATH containing asConfedSequence
while trying to modify: 13237 3549 9002 40965 AS_TRANS
with 4 byte ASPATH:
{ 64600 } 3549 9002 40965 3.196
RFC4893 violation @ 1250489012 from (AS13237 ;195.66.224.99)
with AS4PATH containing asConfedSequence
while trying to modify: 13237 3549 9002 40965 AS_TRANS
with 4 byte ASPATH:
{ 64600 } 3549 9002 40965 3.196
6.1.2 Induced routing instabilities
The routing storm of August 2009 reveals another weak point of BGP-4. As explained
before, the storm happened because an AS Confederation started to use 32-bit ASN
and confederation-internal data were advertised outside the AS Confederation. These
data were flagged as invalid routing data and the BGP-4 session was repeatedly reset,
inducing an oscillation. Additionally, these data were leaked beyond the first faulty link,
other BGP-4 sessions started to oscillate and unrelated prefixes started to flap [5].
This routing storm is reflected in the BGP-4 repositories around the world, including
the LINX. Figure 6.3 shows the aggregated update traffic profile collected by all LINX
collectors for the 17th and the 18th of August 2009. During this period, the LINX
collector received BGP-4 updates from 64 collecting devices installed in 58 Autonomous
Systems. Figure 6.3 confirms the data from the Renesys blog [5] during the incident, as
far as the first traffic peak is concerned. However, the Renesys curve returns to a quiet
state at approximately 23:00 UTC, while the LINX data have a second peak at around
05:00 UTC of the 18th of August. The traffic during this second peak was approximately
50,000 updates per 5 minute bin or 10,000 updates per minute.
Figure 6.4 shows the eCDF of the update arrival times for one of the prefixes that
were affected by the incident and Table 6.2 shows the results of GNUPlot’s [171] linear
fitting routine applied to these data while producing the plot.
Table 6.2: GNU Plot fit results
Final set of parameters Asymptotic Standard Error
m = 15.2496 +/- 0.1209 (0.7928%)
b = -261.093 +/- 2.473 (0.947%)
These fit results allow to compute the time the prefix was affected by the storm:
∆T =
100.0
m
=
100.0
15.25
= 6h 33min
and the instant the storm started affecting the prefix:
t0 =
−b
m
=
261.093
15.2496
= 17h :07min UTC
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Figure 6.3: Traffic profile of the London Internet Exchange during the August, 2009
incident; time bin=5 min
The fact that the linear fit produces such good results is due to the nature of the error
handling mechanism in BGP-4: when an error is detected, the session is restarted and
the session restart timer has a fixed value. The slope of the linear fit is the mean time
between two session resets of between a session reset and the moment the buggy update
is processed by the peer (causing the next session reset).
After processing the data collected by the LINX during the routing storm in an
aggregated manner, I studied them collector by collector. The results show that the
LINX collectors can be classified into three groups:
1. Collectors associated to Autonomous Systems that were not affected by the storm.
2. Collectors associated to Autonomous Systems that were directly affected by the
storm.
3. Collectors associated to Autonomous Systems that were indirectly affected by the
storm.
There are several collectors that fall under the first category. During the storm,
They exhibit a traffic profile similar to that of the days preceding the storm or after
it. The second category includes all collectors that have a different traffic profile during
the traffic storm. One example is shown in Figure 6.5. In this case, the traffic profile is
a superposition of the traffic profile they exhibited shortly before the incident and the
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Figure 6.4: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of BGP-4 update arrivals for a
specific prefix at the London Internet Exchange during the incident
traffic profile from the Renesys curves. This happens because the LINX is topologically
far away from the origin of the incident.
There is one collector that falls under the third category. Its traffic profile is depicted
in Figure 6.6. This collector detected very low BGP-4 traffic before the storm. During
the storm, it exhibits a significant increase in traffic. However, the traffic profile is not
compatible with the Renesys blog profile. It starts approximately one hour after the
storm and is significantly shorter.
In order to understand the cause for the behaviour of this particular collector, I
started by grouping the updates by prefix and studying the resulting update sequences.
Figure 6.7 shows the eCDF of the update sequence lengths. More than 50% of them
are more than 140 updates long. These long sequences are compatible with a routing
storm; they come from links that were affected by session resets for a longer period of
time. These sequences only appear during the main traffic peak. This fact suggests
that they were induced by operations in other ASes during the routing storm and were
suppressed manually, i.e., disabling the routing session with the oscillating neighbour or
with routing policies, by local operations in the affected AS.
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Figure 6.5: Traffic superposition for collector 195.66.225.2
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6.2 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the effect of flaws of the BGP-4 protocol on the operation of
the Internet. I have used publicly available data to show how buggy routing information
and the error handling mechanisms of BGP-4 are creating sources of unexpected insta-
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Figure 6.7: Empirical CDF of sequence lengths during the storm
bility in the Internet. This instability can be spread further by operational procedures.
In my routing architecture, presented further on, the error handling mechanisms are
revisited in order to provide enhanced stability compared with the current solutions.
In the next chapter, I examine how the routing tables of the DFZ in the IPv4 In-
ternet have evolved in the decade 2001–2010. I show how practises related with Traffic
Engineering have contributed to more than a third of the entries in the routing tables.
85

Chapter7
Evolution of the Internet’s Default
Free Zone
Contents
7.1 AS_PATH prepending and Address Space Fragmentation in the In-
ternet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.1.1 Address space fragmentation by leaf ASes . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.1.2 Use of AS_PATH Prepending in the Internet . . . . . . . . . 89
7.1.3 Behaviour of intermediate Autonomous Systems confronted
to disaggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2 Address space fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2.1 Estimating the Aggregation Potential in Routing Tables . . . 92
7.2.2 Evolution of fragmentation between 2001 and 2010 . . . . . . 96
In this chapter, I present my work on the evolution of the routing tables in the
Internet’s DFZ. Its growth is one of the motivations I had to develop the new rout-
ing architecture. I determine how extended the use of address fragmentation and
AS_PATH Prepending is in the Internet. These two techniques are described in Sec-
tion 3.4. They are identified as the basic building blocks for Traffic Engineering using
BGP-4.
While the growth of the routing table in the DFZ might be a solvable issue in
IPv4, it will not be so in the future IPv6 Internet. Policy document RIPE-512 [172]
is very keen on stressing that Service Providers in IPv6 should concentrate on keeping
the IPv6 Internet’s routing table as aggregated as possible. This document has been
agreed by all Regional Internet Registries and is published by all of them using their
own document naming standard. For my study, I have used data coming from RIPE’s
Routing Repository collector rrc00, connected to RIPE’s own segment at the Internet’s
Default Free Zone. It was the first collector established by RIPE and data from very
long periods of time can be retrieved from it.
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7.1 AS_PATH prepending and Address Space
Fragmentation in the Internet
RIR policies for the address assignment process have assured a minimal impact on the
aggregation level of the DFZ of the Internet [173]. Only when faced with the depletion
of their assigned IPv4 address space, aggregation becomes less important. IANA handed
out to the Regional Internet Registries the last /8 allocations of the IPv4 Internet on the
3rd of February, 2011 [174]1. However, looking at the Internet’s DFZ, disaggregation has
been used massively well before the final depletion phase. In fact, some RIRs have not
yet arrived to the depletion phase, but there has always been significant disaggregation
in their allocated address space.
As explained in Chapter 3, influencing how traffic flows in the Internet is implemented
by modifying the routing information of the different ASes. Since the AS_PATH is the
only attribute that is guaranteed to be transmitted beyond the neighbouring ASes,
AS_PATH Prepending is used frequently. Fragmenting the addressing space to shorter
prefixes and controlling the attributes of the resulting sub-prefixes is a way to control
the traffic directed to an AS in scenarios like traffic balancing.
To start with, however, the greater picture of the evolution of the Internet in the last
10 years needs to be examined the following aspects:
• How many ASes use fragmentation as part of their traffic control policies and use it
in such a way that the policies disperse and are observable at topologically distant
points in the Internet?
• How many ASes use AS_PATH Prepending to control the traffic directed to the
prefixes they advertise in such a way that it is observable at topologically distant
points in the Internet?
These two communities will be the most interesting users for my Internet architecture
since they are the main cause for fragmentation and other artifacts in the Internet. Both
cases refer to ASes that advertise prefixes. They are known as leaf ASes, because they
constitute the leafs of the Internet’s routing tree.
7.1.1 Address space fragmentation by leaf ASes
Address space fragmentation creates a significant overhead in terms of additional routes
introduced in the Internet’s DFZ routing tables. Therefore, we need to know how
many ASes are actually applying fragmentation on their advertised routing space. Fig-
ures 7.1 and 7.2 show the evolution in absolute and relative terms for collectors 193.0.0.56
and 202.12.28.190 at the RIPE’s routing repository rrc00 between January 2001 and De-
cember 2010. These are the only two collecting devices of rrc00 that offer uninterrupted
data during this period. During this period, the amount of leaf ASes, i.e., ASes that ac-
tually advertise prefixes into the Internet, has grown almost linearly between 10,000 and
35,000. The fraction of ASes using fragmentation has never been under 20%. During the
economic down-turn around 2001, the fraction of ASes using fragmentation experienced
1The date for the official ceremony was chosen to make it coincide with the Chinese New Year.
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a reduction. It then kept at an approximately constant level until 2007. From that point
onwards, a slight upward trend can be observed. Nowadays, slightly under 10,000 leaf
ASes are using fragmentation These and their immediate upstream providers are the
clear addressees of my alternative routing architecture.
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Figure 7.1: Evolution of the total number of leaf ASes and of leaf ASes using fragmen-
tation in the Internet between 2001 and 2010
7.1.2 Use of AS_PATH Prepending in the Internet
The other trend I needed to study is the use of AS_PATH Prepending by the ASes at
the edge of the Internet. I used the same collectors as in the previous subsection. I
scanned the routing tables they contributed for downstream ASes that were applying
AS_PATH Prepending on their prefixes.
The evolution is shown in Figure 5.1, and basically shows that over 60% of the
downstream ASes observed by the collectors were using AS_PATH Prepending. This
figure shows only the lower bound for the real usage of AS_PATH Prepending. As the
example in Figure 3.1b on Page 20 shows, intermediate Autonomous Systems receiving
two advertisements for a given prefix discard the advertisement with
AS_PATH Prepending because they select the advertisement with the shorter
AS_PATH. This might also happen further towards the core of the Internet.
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7.1.3 Behaviour of intermediate Autonomous Systems
confronted to disaggregation
BGP-4 foresees the possibility for an AS to aggregate the routing information received
from other ASes. This process is, however, restricted to specific conditions in RFC 4271 [2].
During my work, I studied how Internet Service Providers use fragmentation and how
intermediate ASes treat the fragmented advertisements.
Table 7.1: Example of disaggregation in an Internet routing table
Prefix AS_PATH
41.196.112.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.114.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.116.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.118.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.120.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.122.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.140.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.142.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.160.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.162.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.164.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.166.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.168.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.170.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.172.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.174.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.176.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
41.196.178.0/23 9304 4788 8452 8452 8452 24863
Table 7.1 shows an example of an intermediate AS, AS8452, that applies the same
policy to all of the advertisements it receives from one of its clients, AS24863. This client
is a leaf AS that advertises 18 adjacent and, at least partially, aggregate-able prefixes.
This shows that disaggregation introduced at the edges of the Internet is propagated to
the core, where it does not seem to be used. This only leads to increased resource usage
in the DFZ routers in the form of memory to hold the RIB with all the parameters and
computing power in the algorithms computing the FIB from the RIBs.
7.2 Address space fragmentation
As mentioned above, disaggregation is a popular tool in the IPv4 Internet. Houston et al.
monitor this evolution and publish statistics on the CIDR Report web page both for
IPv4 [175] and IPv6 [176]. However, the algorithm they use has not been published. In
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order to provide a reproducible method to estimate disaggregation, I have designed and
implemented my own aggregation algorithm.
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The Internet
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Figure 7.3: A view of the Internet from a Routing Repository
Prefixes assigned by the different Regional Internet Registries to Autonomous Sys-
tems needing public IP addressing are part the public addressing space as per
RFC 1930 [14]. At any given point in time a prefix is assigned to one and only one
AS, although due to the dynamics of the Internet, the assignments may differ for dif-
ferent points in time. In order to detect the configurations presented in Chapter 3 and
eliminate sub-netting, I model the Internet routing table as a directed graph as shown
in Figure 7.3. The root of the graph is the router the routing table was extracted from
and the ASes present in the AS_PATH are the vertexes of the graph. The leaves of the
graph are {AS,Prefix} pairs that represent the address allocations made by the different
RIRs to the ASes in their regions.
7.2.1 Estimating the Aggregation Potential in Routing Tables
In order to estimate the aggregation potential in routing tables, I propose Algorithm 3. It
is not intended to be applied directly in routers, but rather helps assessing the overhead
introduced by current practises to implement multi-homing over different providers,
load balancing, protection against prefix-hijacking, etc. Therefore, optimisations were
not sought and computational time analysis has not been performed. The algorithm
is applied on an initial routing table until no new aggregations can be found. The
concepts of sub- and super-netting are interpreted restrictively, in the sense that prefixes
are associated to the AS that originated them and to the AS_PATH they are received
through and sub- or super-netting is only allowed when both prefixes belong to the same
AS and are reached through the same sequence of Autonomous Systems. The algorithm
uses the following functions, which are graphically presented in Figure 7.4, to check for
possible optimisations:
• nextAggregation(prefix) returns a prefix generated by keeping the base address
and decrementing the prefix mask length by one.
• IsFeasible(prefix) checks whether the prefix is correct, i.e., that all bits in the
prefix host field are zero.
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• Contains(prefix1,prefix2) checks that both prefixes are originated by the same
AS and that both prefixes are reached following the same
AS_PATH and that prefix2 is completely contained in prefix1 .
nextAggregation(prefix )
prefix
1
1
nextAggregation(prefix )
prefix2
2
1 isFeasible() = TRUE
isFeasible() = FALSE
n
(k+1) * 2
n
k * 2
k is even
(k+2) * 2
n (k+3) * 2
n
Figure 7.4: Prefix operations used in Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3 preserves the AS_PATHs from the BGP-4 collector to end hosts. The
BGP-4 routing table of a router is a directed graph. The root of the graph is the router
itself and each leaf contains a prefix that can be reached from the root paired with its
AS. The other nodes of the graph represent the ASes traversed by a packet on its way
to a given prefix. This graph has two types of edges; the regular edges connecting two
nodes and the irregular edges connecting a node with itself. These edges result from
policies in the ASes along the AS_PATH.
Prefix1
Prefix2
AS1
AS2
AS3
AS4
Aggregated Prefix AS1
AS2
AS3
AS4
Figure 7.5: Aggregating two prefixes
Algorithm 3 will only merge two paths of the directed graph if they share all nodes
expect the leafs and if the leafs refer to prefixes that are assigned to the same AS and can
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be aggregated, as shown in Figure 7.5. The algorithm respects the address allocations
made by the RIRs at the time the routing table was collected and the paths followed
by packets at AS level and thus produces equivalent routing tables, in the sense that
packets will arrive to their assigned destinations. Two different modes of comparing the
AS_PATH are possible:
• strict comparison including the artificial edges introduced by
AS_PATH Prepending artifacts, or
• relaxed relaxed comparison eliminating these artificial edges.
Data: InetTable, a routing table as an array of {prefix, AS_PATH} pairs,
ordered in ascending order by the base address of the prefixes
Result: The routing table with one extra level of aggregation and a flag
indicating whether the routing table was modified or not.
changed← false;
foreach index = 0 to length(InetTable)− 2 do
this_Prefix← InetTable[index];
next_Prefix← InetTable[index+ 1];
aggregateThis = nextAggregation(this_Prefix);
if IsFeasible(aggregateThis) then
if Contains(aggregateThis,nextPrefix) then
/* remove next_Prefix from the Internet table */
removeFromTable(InetTable[index+ 1]);
/* replace this_Prefix with the aggregation */
InetTable[index]← aggregateThis;
/* signal that the table has changed */
changed← true;
return changed,InetTable
Algorithm 3: Routing table aggregation algorithm
As a proof of concept for Algorithm 3, I took all the routing tables contributed by
running IPv4 collectors to the rrc00 repository on the 1st of September, 2009 and applied
Algorithm 3 on them. In total, 11 collectors were running that day. I took all the tables
and applied the reduction algorithm on each. Figure 7.6 shows the evolution of the mean
number of routes in the interval size and the mean number of routes aggregated in each
iteration.
Significant aggregation potential could be detected. The mean initial routing table
size was 287,200 routes. After eight iterations, no further aggregation was possible in
any table. The resulting routing table had a size of 206,900 routes. Speaking in relative
terms, the table could be reduced by 28.0% without losing connectivity. Figure 7.6
shows the reduction achieved on the first 6 iterations. It is worth to be noted that the
first iteration reduces the routing table by 18.9%. The improvement is mainly obtained
in the first 4 iterations, where a reduction by approx. 27.7% is achieved.
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Table 7.2: Resulting mean table length in the first 6 iterations of the algorithm applied
to the routing tables collected by rrc00 on the 1st of September, 2009 for different route
matching strategies in the Contains() function (C.I.=95%)
Iteration Full AS_PATH Canonical AS_PATH Origin only
0 2.904e+05 +/- 3223 2.904e+05 +/- 3223 2.904e+05 +/- 3223
1 2.356e+05 +/- 2626 2.346e+05 +/- 2642 2.255e+05 +/- 2385
2 2.18e+05 +/- 2474 2.165e+05 +/- 2512 2.015e+05 +/- 2035
3 2.12e+05 +/- 2442 2.103e+05 +/- 2494 1.924e+05 +/- 1889
4 2.101e+05 +/- 2432 2.082e+05 +/- 2491 1.89e+05 +/- 1832
5 2.096e+05 +/- 2429 2.076e+05 +/- 2490 1.878e+05 +/- 1811
6 2.094e+05 +/- 2429 2.074e+05 +/- 2489 1.875e+05 +/- 1806
7 2.094e+05 +/- 2429 2.074e+05 +/- 2489 1.874e+05 +/- 1804
8 2.094e+05 +/- 2429 2.074e+05 +/- 2488 1.874e+05 +/- 1804
Table 7.2 shows how Algorithm 3 performs with different implementations of the
Contains(prefix1,prefix2) function. The sample is constituted by the routing tables
stored by the rrc00 collector on the 1st September, 2009. The first column indicates
the iteration, the other columns show the mean routing table size at a confidence level
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of 95% for different comparison strategies. The second column shows the mean routing
table size when the full AS_PATH attribute is used by the aggregation algorithm. I
used the Canonical AS_PATH as defined in Section 5.2.2 for the third column, and
the Autonomous System Number of the originator for the fourth column. This last
column represents the resulting routing table size for the Internet’s DFZ if the the RIR
allocations were not fragmented by the ISPs. The difference between the third and
the fourth column in Table 7.2 is due to the prefixes which are advertised through
connections to different ASes. The difference between the second and the third column
in Table 7.2 is due to configurations compatible with Figure 3.1b where one of the links
is not operational: taking the full AS_PATH into account, the prefixes will not be
reduced, whereas removing the AS_PATH Prepending artifacts will make the prefixes
reducible.
7.2.2 Evolution of fragmentation between 2001 and 2010
Finally, I studied the evolution of fragmentation in the Internet between the 1st of
January, 2001 and the 31st of December, 2010. I used routing tables provided by
collectors associated to rrc00 that were active during that whole period, based on the
information provided by Table 3.2. I took the first routing table collected in each month,
applied the aggregation algorithm, and used the resulting routing table sizes until the
third iteration.
Figure 7.7 shows the reduction of the global routing table in the DFZ obtained
running the first three iterations of Algorithm 3 on the routing table contributed to rrc00
between 2001 and 2010 by 193.0.0.53 (Figure 7.7a) and 202.12.28.190 (Figure 7.7b). Both
figures show that the IPv4 routing table in the Internet’s DFZ has not ceased to grow in
the last ten years, despite the economical downturns experienced and the depletion of
the IPv4 address space. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the gap between the curves
widens continuously during the whole observation period.
In order to get a better view of the evolution of the gap between the iterations, I
measure the disaggregation of the Internet routing tables as the ratio between the routes
that were eliminated by Algorithm 3 and the initial size of the routing table:
ρ =
Ninitial −Naggregated
Ninitial
Figure 7.8 shows the evolution of this aggregation ratio during the period of observa-
tion for the two collectors selected previously. They show that ρ grew linearly between
2002 and 2009, while during 2010, ρ remained approximately constant. Possible expla-
nations for this behaviour are:
• The deep economic crisis that started around that time, which would have slowed
down the growth of the Internet. However, no graph in Figure 7.7 suggests that
this happened, because during 2010, the IPv4 routing table continued to grow.
Moreover, as Figure 7.1 shows, the number of leaf ASes continued to grow during
2010 as in the previous years despite the economical downturn. Additionally, as
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Figure 7.2 shows, there is a slight upward tendency in the use of address space
fragmentation by leaf ASes.
• The depletion of the IPv4 routing space that has forced the RIRs to allocate smaller
prefixes to ASes. This would translate in less possibilities to fragment the address-
ing space, given that the smallest prefixes that can be advertised to the Internet
are /24 [177]. However, the flattening began more than one year before the last
/8 prefixes were handed over to the Regional Internet Registries.
• The transformation in the Internet’s core observed by Labovitz et al. [178]. In
this recently published paper, the authors argue that the structure of the Internet
has changed radically. Some of the ASes in the core of Internet have experienced
traffic growth because they are the ones that host the most popular applications,
sites, etc. According to the authors, the core ASes have evolved from simple traffic
exchanges to traffic sources. Thus, they are no longer interested in controlling
their input traffic. This task has been passed to the new consumer ASes, who
are charged by the traffic volume they consume. Labovitz et al. observe the
behaviour of several core Internet providers in their paper and show how there
is a turning point between 2009 and 2010, when some significant ASes ceased to
behave as transit ASes and started exhibiting traffic patterns typical for ASes with
important traffic sources. As of writing this work, another move to consolidate the
core of the Internet has happened with the merger of two major Internet players:
Global Crossing and Level-3 [179]. It remains to be seen how this merger will
affect the structure of the core of the Internet.
It is therefore highly plausible that the flattening of the ρ curves is linked to the last
cause. However, it has to be noted that the point at which this flattening happens is 30%.
Therefore, any architecture capable of significantly reducing the level of fragmentation in
the IPv4 routing table may by useful in the transition phase between IPv4 and IPv6. A
smaller IPv4 routing table means that the router has to devote less resources to manage
it. There resources can be made available for other tasks, like handling a growing IPv6
table or implementing the IPv4/IPv6 transition mechanism of choice for any given ISP.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the overall evolution of the Internet routing tables
between 2001 and 2010. It has shown that the fragmentation of the IPv4 accounted
for about a third of the routes in the Internet’s Default Free Zone in 2010.
In the next chapter, I present my proposal for an alternative routing architecture that
can be deployed at the edges of the Internet and will result in smaller routing tables
at the core of the Internet. I explore possible implementation strategies and discuss
my prototype implementation and how it would impact the overall behaviour of the
Internet.
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8. AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTING ARCHITECTURE
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the short-comings of the current Internet
routing architecture.
This research shows how overloading BGP-4 with additional features in order to cope
with new services opens the door to a less stable Internet in the future and has motivated
me to design an alternate routing architecture that simplifies the use of BGP-4 in the
core of the Internet.
This work concentrates on the use of parallel routing planes and on the benefits
to the routing plane in the core of the Internet when this architecture is used at the
edges. BGP-4 is known to have security flaws and these are addressed elsewhere. My
architecture will benefit from these security enhancements once they are implemented
in BGP-4 routing daemons. However, security problems are not the main focus of my
work.
This chapter is based on material published in the MONAMI 2010 [11] and MON-
AMI 2011 [13] conferences and in the Mobile Networks and Management Journal [12].
8.1 PaRArch: A Routing Architecture for the
Internet based on Parallel Routing Tables
BGP-4 is the protocol that conveys reachability information between Autonomous Sys-
tems in the Internet. In the previous chapters, I have shown
1. that introducing new features in the BGP-4 protocol has led to routing storms due
to the current error detection and response mechanism of the protocol,
2. that routing operations in one Autonomous System propagate through the Inter-
net, and
3. that around 30% of the entries in the Internet DFZ routing tables are used for
local traffic distribution purposes and can be avoided with adequate aggregation
These inefficiencies have motivated me to design and implement an alternate routing
architecture for the Internet. It is backward compatible, non-mandatory and may be
adopted incrementally in different regions in the Internet, especially at its edge. It
contributes to stabilising the Internet in the following ways:
1. Smaller routing tables mean a less resource-intensive BGP-4 process and better
debugging capabilities, avoiding the problems linked to multi-homing scenarios
described in Section 3.4.2.
2. It isolates the main Internet routing table from TE-related phenomena like those
presented in Chapter 5 and from instabilities due to bugs introduced by new pro-
tocol features like those described in Chapter 6.
In order to implement this new architecture, I propose to introduce a new routing
plane in the Internet. In this section, I discuss the routing plane structure and the
AS-level design of PaRArch and then discuss the architecture of a PaRArch enabled
router.
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8.1.1 Routing planes in PaRArch
I use the term “routing plane” in the sense of network realm where routes with specific
semantics are treated. Looking at the current Internet, we find the following categories
of routing information1:
• The inter-domain routing information needed to reach hosts outside an AS that
is handled by an EGP, the de-facto standard EGP being BGP-4.
• The intra-domain routing information that is handled by one or more IGPs like
OSPF [24], IS-IS [25], etc. within the AS.
These two routing information categories are carried by two different routing planes:
1. the interior routing plane with fine-grain routing information that is used to reach
specific destinations within an AS
2. the exterior or inter-domain routing plane with coarser-grain routing information
that is used to transfer packets between Autonomous Systems.
This use of the term “plane” is compatible with the way that GROW uses it when talking
about route-reflection planes [180].
PaRArch extends the routing plane structure of the Internet by an additional routing
plane. This routing plane is deployed between adjacent ASes that have a multi-homed
connection as shown in Figure 3.1. ASes that are near from a topological point of view,
i.e., those that are two hops away, and have multiple paths that connected them can also
use this architecture (an example is shown further down in Figure 8.8). Since the routing
information carried by PaRArch is exchanged between ASes, the routing protocol has to
be an EGP. Therefore, the designated routing protocol for the PaRArch routing plane
is BGP-4. The routing information carried by the PaRArch routing plane is kept local
between the peering ASes, i.e., it will not be injected in the global inter-domain routing
plane.
As shown previously with Algorithm 3, a significant portion of the Internet routing
tables can be aggregated. Using this insight, I classify inter-domain routing information
into two categories:
1. Best aggregations of the Internet routing table that are obtained when Algorithm 3
is not able to further aggregate the routing table.
2. De-aggregated networks: networks of the original routing table that are replaced
with more aggregated networks by Algorithm 3.
PaRArch uses this classification to assign prefixes to routing planes: (i) the global inter-
domain routing plane carries the best aggregations; and (ii) the new inter-domain routing
plane introduced with PaRArch carries the de-aggregated routing information. This
task split assures (i) that all prefixes can be reached from any point in the Internet and
(ii) that peering agreements between ASes can be implemented without bloating the size
of the Internet’s DFZ routing table.
1Provider-specific implementations using MPLS may include more categories like MPLS-VPN.
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8.1.2 Interaction between routing planes in PaRArch
The interior and the exterior routing planes of the Internet interact whenever there is the
need to transfer routing information from one plane to another. Ideally, this interaction
is minimal in order to guarantee that the inter-domain routing plane is stable and is
achieved by injecting or redistributing aggregated routing information from the interior
into the exterior routing plane at designated points in the AS [181]. eBGP information
needs to be redistributed into the IGP in specific cases. However, the use of iBGP in
the AS is preferred in these cases [62].
PaRArch defines a stricter prefix redistribution policy. As shown in Figure 8.1,
the IGP can inject any level of aggregation into the PaRArch inter-domain routing
plane. However, it can only inject the best aggregations to the global inter-domain
routing plane. Redistributing routing information from the PaRArch or the Internet
inter-domain routing plane into the intradomain routing plane is explicitly forbidden.
Whenever information coming from the PaRArch routing plane is needed, the PaRArch
routing plane is extended using iBGP inside theAS.
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Figure 8.1: Redistribution policies between routing planes in PaRArch
Interconnecting chains of ASes using a PaRArch routing plane is possible. In the
current version of the PaRArch routing architecture, this happens through independent
routing realms established between pairs of peering ASes. The possibility of creating a
PaRArch routing realm spanning more than two ASes is out of the scope of this work
and left for future study.
8.1.3 AS-level deployment of PaRArch
PaRArch is designed to be deployed at the edge of the Internet because that is the main
source of disaggregation. It has to be compatible with setups like the one shown in
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Figure 3.1, where leaf ASes advertise their assigned address space using disaggregation
over different links with different policies. However, the first common upstream AS
consolidates the advertisements and all prefixes are advertised to the next upstream
AS with the same AS_PATH. PaRArch is based on the principle that this routing
information, which is needed for local purposes like traffic balancing or other traffic
engineering purposes between two ASes, is exchanged exclusively between the leaf AS
and the first upstream AS and kept in a routing table that holds this specific (and local)
routing information and not in the global Internet routing table. Additionally, and in
order to guarantee that the leaf AS is reachable from beyond the first upstream AS, the
leaf AS advertises the best aggregation – usually the RIR address delegations – to the
global Internet routing tables.
AS3
AS4
BGP-4 routing instance
PaRArch routing instance (using BGP-4)
Global Internet routing plane
PaRArch routers
Figure 8.2: Incremental deployment of PaRArch between adjacent ASes
Figure 8.2 shows how this new architecture can be deployed between a leaf AS and
its first upstream provider: AS1 and AS2 have signed a peering agreement that requires
a specific distribution of traffic among the links that interconnect them. They use
PaRArch the following way:
• AS1 is the client and needs to control the traffic it received from its provider.
It requests the use of PaRArch from AS2 and configures the peering using the
following rules:
1. In order to assure that AS1 is globally reachable, it advertises its best aggre-
gations on all its peering in the global Internet routing plane. This includes
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the peering with AS4. Policies based on AS_PATH Prepending control how
the Internet beyond its direct peers (AS3 in Figure 8.2) is going to send the
traffic to it.
2. In order to comply with the traffic distribution agreed upon in the SLA, AS1
uses address space fragmentation; it advertises sub-prefixes of the address
space it has been assigned by its RIR on the PaRArch routing plane.
• AS2 is the provider. It announces that it offers a connectivity service based on
PaRArch. When a client requests the service, it enables a PaRArch peering to it.
This architecture can also be deployed in scenarios where PaRArch-enabled ASes are
not directly connected, as shown in Section 8.3.4.1. Figure 8.3 shows how it would be
accomplished.
Global Internet routing plane
PaRArch enabled routers
BGP-4 routing instance
PaRArch routing instance
Figure 8.3: Incremental deployment of PaRArch between non-adjacent ASes
The advertising strategy is the same as above – best aggregations in the Internet
routing plane and disaggregated prefixes in the PaRArch routing plane. In this case,
PaRArch works like this:
• The best aggregations advertised by AS1 assure that the intermediate ASes AS3
and AS4 can reach AS1.
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• The unaggregated prefixes advertised through the PaRArch routing plane allow
AS2 to balance traffic directed to AS1.
8.1.4 High-level design of a PaRArch enabled router
Figure 8.4 shows a block diagram of the BGP-4 section in a PaRArch enabled router.
PaRArch adds an additional BGP-4 infrastructure with a dedicated RIB to a normal
BGP-4 router. The original BGP-4 routing instance handles the main RIB and is in
charge of the routing information that is present in the Internet’s routing table. This RIB
holds the best aggregations of the PaRArch peers. The local routing setups, expressed
as sub-networks of the best aggregations, are migrated to a second routing table. This
second routing table is only maintained between and managed by the PaRArch peers
and implemented in an additional BGP-4 routing instance2. The RIBs managed by
both routing instances are consolidated by the Route Decision Processs of BGP-4 and
the PaRArch EGP. The routes selected by these RDPs are fed back to the BGP-4 and
PaRArch routing instances marked as routes that are advertised to peers and injected
into the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) of the router. In case of collision, i.e., when
a prefix is present in the PaRArch and the global Internet routing planes, PaRArch
routes take precedence over global Internet routes.
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Figure 8.4: A high level view of the PaRArch routing architecture at the router level
2In a generalised design, any EGP could be used. Since BGP-4 is the current de-facto standard
EGP, the implementation I propose uses BGP-4.
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Figure 8.4 shows the relationship between the different RIBs and the FIB in a
PaRArch-enabled router. The support for the BGP-4 information destined for the In-
ternet’s DFZ is provided by the left side of the figure. It represents the architecture
of a state-of-the-art BGP-4 router. The right side of Figure 8.4 shows the PaRArch
infrastructure of the router.
The novelty of this approach is having two isolated EGP instances running in parallel
and prioritising how the entries from their respective RIBs are inserted in a common
FIB in the router. In a traditional router, there is a similar process between the EGP
and the IGP. Here the IGP has always less preference than the EGP. When more
than one EGP instances are used, like in current MPLS-based VPN environments, the
routing tables are isolated and there is no interaction between routing entries coming
from different MPLS-VPN routing instances.
8.2 Prototype implementation
In the previous section I have presented the PaRArch architecture. In this setion, I
present a proof of concept implementation of a PaRArch router and show how a de-
ployment of the architecture could look like using a network emulation environment, to
confirm that it is feasible and that the basic functionality works as expected.
8.2.1 Implementation alternatives
Before selecting the final environment for my proof of concept implementation of
PaRArch, I pondered the advantages of using an emulated versus a simulated envi-
ronment. I went for an emulated environment, because, at this stage, functional com-
pleteness was more important for me than precise timing. Another motivation for using
the emulated environment was that I could reuse an open-source carrier-grade imple-
mentation of the basic router functionality as the foundation of my implementation and
concentrate on implementing the distinguishing aspects of the PaRArch architecture.
8.2.1.1 Simulation environments
While the results regarding timing on a simulation environment can be very accurate,
the implementation of multiple RIBs and their interactions with the FIB need to be as
close as possible to those in a real router. Implementing these interactions in a simulated
environment introduces additional complexities. I was confronted to them when I tried to
implement a simulation based on JSim [182], a Java-based simulation environment with
which I have reasonable experience. I participated in the implementation of the simulator
used in the 4WARD project [183] to evaluate a BGP-4-based migration scenario [184] and
there I saw that my objectives with regard to multiple routing tables where completely
out of scope for JSim. It does not implement the Route Decision Process completely
and has no way of determining whether the next hop is available or not.
Additionally, the simulated architecture needs then to be exported or migrated to
a router code base in order to provide a practical implementation. This is possible to
108
8.2. Prototype implementation
some extent with simulation packages like ns2 [185] or ns3 [186]. However, having limited
prior experience in either of them, I felt I would not have the necessary confidence in
the results of my simulations.
8.2.1.2 Network emulation environments
Network emulation environments like Netkit [139] or GNS3 [187] are discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.1. They provide a realistic environment to test real router implementations. For
my experiments I finally selected Netkit for the following reasons:
1. At the time of starting my development it was a stable environment while GNS3
had just been released and was still under heavy development.
2. I had already used both Netkit and Quagga previously and could start my devel-
opment fairly quickly.
3. The main added-value of GNS3 is the possibility of using real-world router operat-
ing system images. However, PaRArch is not supported by any vendor and there
is no access to the source code behind those images to modify them and integrate
PaRArch functionality in them.
8.2.1.3 Open-source routing toolkits
The different source code bases for BGP-4 are discussed in Section 4.5.2. For the purpose
of my experiments, XORP [147] and Quagga [83] were the best candidates available when
I started the project. An additional advantage of the Quagga-on-Netkit environment was
that I had prior experience in developing and testing modifications to the BGP-4 routing
protocol on this environment. This experience reduced the learning curve significantly.
8.2.2 Implementation
The proof of concept for PaRArch was implemented in a prototype based on a modified
Quagga daemon and tested on a Netkit environment. Routing table management is
implemented directly using features provided by Linux. The Linux kernel supports
multiple IPv4 and IPv6 routing tables [188] that can be assigned different priorities.
These priorities are controlled with the ip rule command. Documented usage of this
routing table prioritisation mechanism is to provide isolation between traffics coming
from or directed to an interface in a Linux machine [189].
The default rules installed on a Linux router on startup are:
0: from all lookup local
32766: from all lookup main
32767: from all lookup default
Routing tables are included into the lookup mechanism with the ip rule add command.
By default, any new table is added before the main routing table. This effectively means
that it has a higher priority than the main routing table when installing routes into the
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FIB. In my implementation, I use routing table 10 and add it to the lookup rules with
the command ip rule add from all lookup 10. This results in the following lookup
rules:
0: from all lookup local
32765: from all lookup 10
32766: from all lookup main
32767: from all lookup default
The modifications introduced into the Quagga routing suite3 are the following:
1. The Zebra protocol [145] used to exchange routing information between the ze-
bra daemon and the different routing daemons (bgpd, ripd, ospfd, etc.) has been
enhanced with a new optional field that holds the kernel routing table identifier.
Routing table query and set operations can now address any kernel routing table.
2. The zebra daemon was modified to handle multiple kernel routing tables in the
Netlink protocol interface. Netlink is the user-kernel communication protocol that
handles routing tables in Linux equipment. It is defined in RFC 3549 [190].
3. The command line interface of the bgd daemon was enhanced to accept a table
identifier on the command line. Some minor inconsistencies in the command line
interface regarding definition of the TCP port used for the BGP-4 protocol were
corrected.
8.3 Proof of Concept
For the proof of concept for the multi-table, multi-daemon architecture I selected a
scenario where a leaf AS and one of its upstream providers decide to migrate the traffic
control to a parallel routing table. I used an emulated testbed that mimics the layered
three-tier structure of the Internet as observed in 2010 [178].
8.3.1 Use Case
The use case for the proposed architecture is that of a provider and a client AS at
the border of the Internet. Both are interconnected by two geographically independent
links. They have established an interconnection agreement that mandates that the
downstream traffic (from provider to client) has to be balanced between the two links
and never exceed 50% of the total traffic. This ensures that the surviving link can take
over all the downstream traffic in case of failure of either of the links. The scenario is
sketched in Figure 8.2 and the test cases are explained in Section 8.3.2. The use case also
shows how an incremental deployment at the edges of the Internet of PaRArch would
look like.
3See Section 4.5.2 for a description of the Zebra and Quagga routing protocol suites.
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Figure 8.5: High-Level View of the Prototype implementation on Linux
8.3.2 Test cases for a PaRArch-enabled router
The objective of the PaRArch architecture is to provide flexibility in the interconnection
of a leaf AS by keeping the possibility of locally using routing configurations implemented
using address space fragmentation, and, at the same time, isolate the Internet DFZ from
these configurations. This results in two generic use cases. In the following, I refer to
the proof of concept topology shown in Figure 8.6.
Traffic Engineering in the local routing plane
This test case shows the basic functionality of PaRArch. A pair of neighbouring ASes
decides to setup a parallel routing plane in order to control the traffic they exchange. In
this case, we need to test the following functionalities:
1. Setting up PaRArch: it should be possible to establish a parallel routing plane
between AS1012 and AS1002.
2. Traffic should flow as intended: the traffic distribution between the two links
should be controllable in such manner that traffic directed to either of the two
traffic sinks h_6402 and h_6502 should flow using either interconnection link
depending on the locally programmed policy.
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Stable global routing plane
This test case shows how the rest of the world perceives a PaRArch region. From the
outside world, this region should be seen as a stable region of the Internet that advertises
clients with the best aggregation possible. The main feature that needs to be tested is
that:
1. local routes should not leak into the global routing plane. Independent
from any local policy, the other Autonomous Systems should receive a stable rout-
ing advertisement with the best aggregation only.
8.3.3 Testbed Implementation
The development and tests of the modified Quagga and a proof of concept were imple-
mented in a Netkit [139, 191] environment. The topology is shown in Figure 8.6. It fol-
lows the general principle of the layered three-tier topology proposed by
Labovitz et al. [178]. All Autonomous Systems are implemented using one router only.
The central core layer is implemented by four fully meshed ASes, r_100 to r_103. The
second layer is implemented with r_1000, r_1001, r_1002 and r_1003. r_1002 im-
plements the upstream PaRArch Autonomous System. The third layer is implemented
again by r_1010, r_1011 and r_1012.
This last router is the core of the downstream PaRArch Autonomous System AS1002,
which includes two hosts with active probes. These hosts are connected to the infras-
tructure through two different Local Area Networks (LANs) that have prefixes that
are different but can be aggregated: 6.0.4.0/24 and 6.0.5.0/24. In order to show that
traffic control at the link level is made possible by PaRArch with no routes leaking
from the PaRArch routing plane to the main routing plane, I advertise these prefixes
on the links in the PaRArch routing plane and the aggregate prefix (6.0.4.0/23) on the
main routing plane. I use a simple routing policy deployment script that changes the
AS_PATH Prepending of the two prefixes advertised by AS1012 in the PaRArch rout-
ing plane. Since this routing plane is controlled by specific BGP-4 daemons, the control
scripts connect to the PaRArch daemon. As shown in Listing 8.1, the script is imple-
mented using expect [192] and the Quagga CLI language. This is equivalent to current
practises in real networks using Cisco routers.
In order to test the effect on the path followed by packets, I use active tomography
probes (implemented with traceroute [193]) on the test hosts. Figure 8.7 shows the
graphical representation of the result of an experiment that lasted 8 hours. During
this time, the path was probed every 15 seconds and the policy was changed every five
minutes (as shown in Listing 8.2). The figure shows the IP addresses of the interfaces
and paths detected by the traceroute probes. The table shows the mean round-trip
time measured by the probe as well as number of probing instances that detected each
host. The interfaces in the second hop where not traversed by the same number of
probes because the measurement process and the route changer script where launched
independently.
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Figure 8.6: Proof of concept topology
8.3.4 Evaluation of the Traffic Balancing Use Case
The proof of concept network emulation environment was used to compare different
traffic balancing techniques that can be considered current practises. Two different
situations were examined:
1. Stub AS with first upstream (Tier 1) AS
2. Stub AS with Tier 0 AS
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6.0.2.1
10.0.0.41
10.0.0.46
6.0.4.1
10.0.0.57 10.0.0.61
 Host        IP        N     RTT
r_1012    6.0.4.1   1910  0.436 ms
r_1002  10.0.0.61    954  0.892 ms
r_1002  10.0.0.57    956  0.897 ms
r_103   10.0.0.46   1910  1.361 ms
r_1001  10.0.0.41   1910  1.854 ms
r_1011    6.0.2.1   1910  2.100 ms
Figure 8.7: Graphical output of the tomography tool
The stub AS case has been used in other instances [70]. Taking into account the consoli-
dation process in the Internet, the number of Tier2 ASes connected to only one provider
will grow. These ASes should be connected by more than one link and will need to use
disaggregation in order to implement traffic balancing. In these cases, PaRArch in its
current IPv4 implementation or in a future version supporting IPv6 depending on the
evolution of this protocol, could provide a valuable tool to avoid further growth of the
Internet routing tables.
During my tests, I compared PaRArch with the following, well-known techniques to
differentiate between the two upstream links of AS1012:
1. Marking using well-known communities : The well-known NO_ADVERTISE com-
munity is used to direct the traffic to the two sub-networks through the different
links.
2. Marking using Multi-Exit Discriminators : The MED attribute is used to signal
preference for the incoming traffic.
3. AS_PATH Prepending: Different lengths in the AS_PATH attribute signal the
preference of the two links.
These techniques were compared with the PaRArch architecture. The criteria used
for this comparison were whether the sub-nets are advertised in the Internet’s DFZ
or not, whether during this process they keep the metric information for use further
upstream and whether operation and maintenance procedures may result in accidental
leakage of prefixes. I used in all cases a correct configuration that implemented the
intended traffic flows.
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Table 8.1: Comparison between different BGP-4 control techniques
Subnets Subnets keep Risk of Impact on DFZ’s
advertised metric leak routing table size
Community No N/A Yes Leaked subnets progress
NO_ADVERTISE to the Internet
MED Yes No N/A N/A
AS_PATH Yes Yes N/A The subnets progress
Prepend to the Internet
PaRArch No N/A No The subnets do not
progress to the Internet
This comparison is shown in Table 8.1. It can be argued what quality criteria to use
in this classification. I prefer either not to advertise at all, or making sure that once a
prefix is advertised, the routing information is correctly mapped to the preferences for
inbound traffic defined by the AS that advertises them. In this sense, the Multi-Exit
Discriminator or the NO_ADVERTISE community provide a valid solution. However,
they have their drawbacks: MEDs are known to oscillate [194] and any community-based
marking can be easily interfered with by a router misconfiguration. Regarding routing
table size growth in the Default Free Zone, AS_PATH Prepending performs worse than
the proposed architecture. The same applies for the Multi-Exit Discriminator and the
NO_ADVERTISE community in case of misconfiguration.
8.3.4.1 Interaction with a Tier-1 provider
The four marking techniques shown in Table 8.1 only apply between directly connected
ASes. If a leaf AS like AS1012 needs to interact with a Tier-1 AS, only PaRArch or
AS_PATH Prepending can be used. In this case, the leaf AS needs to establish the
BGP-4 sessions for PaRArch using multi-hop and the ASN of the Tier-1 AS. The Tier-1
AS also needs to know the peering information for the leaf AS that is requesting the
connection.
Figure 8.8 shows an example of a routing configuration with unintended side ef-
fects that can be avoided by PaRArch. Listing 8.4 shows how the additional link be-
tween AS2001 and AS2002 creates unintended routing effects on current BGP-4 im-
plementations. Listing 8.3 shows that this does not happen with PaRArch. AS1000
advertises more specific prefixes to AS3000 in order to control the main traffic over the
PaRArch routing plane. AS2001 and AS2002 receive the aggregated prefixes without
AS_PATH Prepending. AS2001 and AS2002 therefore always compute better reacha-
bility through the direct links and traffic diversions like the one presented in Figure 8.8
do not happen.
Listing 8.5 shows the main routing table at AS3000 when the link between AS2001
and AS2002 is down. Listing 8.6 shows the main routing table at AS3000 when the
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Figure 8.8: Unintended side effects of Traffic Engineering using AS_PATH Prepending
link between AS2001 and AS2002 is up. When comparing it to Listing 8.4, it can
be easily seen that in the absence of AS_PATH Prepending, BGP-4 has chosen the
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shortest paths between the Autonomous Systems. Additionally, the main routing table
hold information of the most aggregated prefixes, i.e., 192.168.0.0/23 for AS1000 and
192.168.4.0/23 for AS3000.
Listing 8.7 shows that the routes followed by packets to AS1000 when link is up and
down are the same. The policies are applied in the PaRArch routing plane of r_1000
using the configuration shown in Listing 8.8. This configuration needs no readjustment
depending on the state of the connection between AS2001 and AS2002.
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Listing 8.1: Policy enforcement scripts
#!/ usr/bin/expect
if {[ llength $argv] == 0} {
set site "localhost"
} else {
set site [lindex $argv 0]
}
if {[ llength $argv] == 2} {
set port [lindex $argv 1]
} else {
set port "bgpd"
}
spawn telnet $site $port
expect "Password: "
send "zebra\r"
expect "AS1012 > "
send "ena\r"
expect "AS1012# "
send "conf t\r"
expect "( config )# "
send "router bgp 1012\r"
expect "(config -router )# "
send "neighbor 10.0.0.57 route -map upper out\r"
expect "(config -router )# "
send "neighbor 10.0.0.61 route -map lower out\r"
expect "(config -router )# "
send "end\r"
expect "AS1012# "
send "clear ip bgp * soft out\r"
expect "AS1012# "
send "exit\r"
Listing 8.2: Script that triggers a policy change
#!/ bin/bash
if [ -z "$*" ]; then
router =" localhost"
else
router=$1
fi
echo Router is $router
while [ true ]; do
/hostlab/toupper $router
date "+%R %F"
sleep 300
/hostlab/tolower $router
date "+%R %F"
sleep 300
done
Listing 8.3: Intended routing configuration before the link is activated
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 192.168.3.1
BGP table ID is 0
Status codes: s suppressed , d damped , h history , * valid , > best , i - internal ,
r RIB -failure , S Stale , R Removed
Origin codes: i - IGP , e - EGP , ? - incomplete
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
* 192.168.0.0 10.0.0.14 0 3000 2001 1000 i
*> 10.0.0.5 0 0 1000 1000 1000 i
*> 192.168.1.0 10.0.0.5 0 0 1000 i
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* 192.168.2.0 10.0.0.14 0 3000 2001 i
*> 10.0.0.5 0 1000 2001 i
*> 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.0 0 32768 i
* 192.168.4.0/23 10.0.0.5 0 1000 2001 3000 i
*> 10.0.0.14 0 0 3000 i
Total number of prefixes 5
Listing 8.4: Unintended routing configuration after the link is activated
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 192.168.3.1
BGP table ID is 0
Status codes: s suppressed , d damped , h history , * valid , > best , i - internal ,
r RIB -failure , S Stale , R Removed
Origin codes: i - IGP , e - EGP , ? - incomplete
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
*> 192.168.0.0 10.0.1.1 0 2001 1000 i
* 10.0.0.14 0 3000 2001 1000 i
* 10.0.0.5 0 0 1000 1000 1000 i
*> 192.168.1.0 10.0.0.5 0 0 1000 i
*> 192.168.2.0 10.0.1.1 0 0 2001 i
* 10.0.0.14 0 3000 2001 i
* 10.0.0.5 0 1000 2001 i
*> 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.0 0 32768 i
* 192.168.4.0/23 10.0.1.1 0 2001 3000 i
* 10.0.0.5 0 1000 2001 3000 i
*> 10.0.0.14 0 0 3000 i
Total number of prefixes 5
Listing 8.5: BGP-4 table at r_3000 when link between AS2001 and AS 2002 is down
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 192.168.5.1
BGP table ID is 0
Status codes: s suppressed , d damped , h history , * valid , > best , i - internal ,
r RIB -failure , S Stale , R Removed
Origin codes: i - IGP , e - EGP , ? - incomplete
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
* 192.168.0.0/23 10.0.0.13 0 2002 1000 i
*> 10.0.0.9 0 2001 1000 i
* 192.168.2.0 10.0.0.13 0 2002 1000 2001 i
*> 10.0.0.9 0 0 2001 i
* 192.168.3.0 10.0.0.9 0 2001 2002 i
*> 10.0.0.13 0 0 2002 i
*> 192.168.4.0/23 0.0.0.0 0 32768 i
Total number of prefixes 4
Listing 8.6: BGP-4 table at r_3000 when link between AS2001 and AS2002 is up
BGP table version is 0, local router ID is 192.168.5.1
BGP table ID is 0
Status codes: s suppressed , d damped , h history , * valid , > best , i - internal ,
r RIB -failure , S Stale , R Removed
Origin codes: i - IGP , e - EGP , ? - incomplete
Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path
* 192.168.0.0/23 10.0.0.13 0 2002 1000 i
*> 10.0.0.9 0 2001 1000 i
119
8. AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTING ARCHITECTURE
* 192.168.2.0 10.0.0.13 0 2002 2001 i
*> 10.0.0.9 0 0 2001 i
* 192.168.3.0 10.0.0.9 0 2001 2002 i
*> 10.0.0.13 0 0 2002 i
*> 192.168.4.0/23 0.0.0.0 0 32768 i
Total number of prefixes 4
Listing 8.7: traceroute from r_1000 to r_3000
Link between AS2001 and AS2002 down
1 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 1 ms 1 ms 0 ms
2 192.168.4.1 (192.168.4.1) 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms
1 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6) 1 ms 1 ms 0 ms
2 192.168.5.1 (192.168.5.1) 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms
Link between AS2001 and AS2002 up
1 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 1 ms 1 ms 0 ms
2 192.168.4.1 (192.168.4.1) 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms
1 10.0.0.6 (10.0.0.6) 1 ms 1 ms 0 ms
2 192.168.5.1 (192.168.5.1) 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms
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Listing 8.8: PaRArch configuration for AS 1000
hostname AS1000
password zebra
!
router bgp 1000
bgp router -id 192.168.1.1
network 192.168.0.0/24
network 192.168.1.0/24
neighbor 10.0.0.10 remote -as 3000
neighbor 10.0.0.10 port 2609
neighbor 10.0.0.10 ebgp -multihop 255
neighbor 10.0.0.10 update -source eth0
neighbor 10.0.0.10 route -map upper out
neighbor 10.0.0.14 remote -as 3000
neighbor 10.0.0.14 port 2609
neighbor 10.0.0.14 ebgp -multihop 255
neighbor 10.0.0.14 update -source eth1
neighbor 10.0.0.14 route -map lower out
!
access -list 1 permit 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255
access -list 2 permit 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255
!
route -map upper permit 10
match ip address 2
set as-path prepend 1000
!
route -map upper permit 20
!
route -map lower permit 10
match ip address 1
set as-path prepend 1000
!
route -map lower permit 20
!
8.4 Benefits of PaRArch
In this section, I describe the three main benefits of PaRArch, namely (i) it simplifies
route management, thereby reducing the Operational Expenses (OPEX) of ISPs (ii) it
reduces the size requirements for the FIB, which is one of the most expensive components
in a router, and (iii) it increases the overall stability of the Internet.
8.4.1 Simplifications in route management
Currently, route management in the Internet involves three players under normal cir-
cumstances. (1) The leaf AS that advertises a set of routes covering the address space
the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) has delegated it, (2) the first upstream provider
AS that may apply a first filtering, and (3) the rest of the ASes that receive the routes.
In this context, route management actions are mainly performed by the AS originat-
ing the prefix and its first upstream provider. The leaf AS has to advertise the routes
complying to the address space delegations and restrictions imposed by RIR policies
and the first upstream provider normally applies some filters in order to prevent buggy
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advertisements corrupting its routing tables. These filters have to take RIR policies into
account as well.
With PaRArch, the leaf AS advertises its best aggregations to the global routing
plane. Filtering in this plane is restricted to the best aggregations. All prefixes used for
traffic control prefixes are advertised in the PaRArch routing plane and will not progress
further than the first provider AS into the Internet. This implies that route filtering is
simplified for the first provider AS. The burden for the leaf AS is approximately the
same. It will continue advertising the same amount of prefixes, although distributed
between the global and the PaRArch routing plane.
When a misconfiguration occurs in an AS in the Internet and traffic from the leaf
AS is diverted, the current situation is more complex and the root-cause analysis phase
might take some time. We can distinguish two situations:
(1) The prefix that is involved in the incident is not being used by the leaf AS that
“owns” the address space where it lies.
(2) The leaf AS is using the same prefix that is involved in the incident either for TE
purposes or to prevent attacks by other ASes.
In the first case, the leaf AS can ask the provider AS where the wrong advertisement
originated and ask the AS that is responsible for the incident to withdraw it. In the
second case, the provider AS will not consolidate the wrong prefix: the AS_PATH
attribute will be shorter for the leaf AS than for the attacking AS. The attacked AS
will have to start asking other ASes that have experienced a route change for assistance.
An example for this is the YouTube hijacking incident [120].
With PaRArch, the overall situation is equivalent to the first case and the provider
AS can assist the leaf AS in restoring lawful routing.
8.4.2 Reduction of the FIB size
Additionally, this architecture will allow a significant reduction of the amount of routes
in the global routing tables. This has a direct impact on the design of core routers:
the RIBs are smaller and consume less memory. Additionally, any FIB size reduction
algorithm implemented by the router will have to process smaller RIBs and require less
resources to achieve the same result.
Reversing the current trend towards fragmentation of the Default Free Zone should
not have any impact on the ability of transit ISPs to implement traffic balancing based
on their clients’ advertisements. Upstream ISPs are expected to have enough clients to
arrive at a near optimum traffic distribution using their best aggregations. This is also
consistent with the behaviour of intermediate ASes shown in Section 7.1.3.
8.4.3 Overall Stability and Robustness
PaRArch uses parallel BGP-4 sessions. This provides the best isolation between the
different routing tables. In case of a routing storm due to implementation deficiencies in
one of the routing daemons, the other session will remain unaffected. Since the Internet
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DFZ routing table is handled by a plain and unmodified BGP-4 routing daemon, imple-
mentation deficiencies are less likely to appear here. This behaviour is more desirable
than emulating an MP-BGP session managing several routing tables and other proposals
brought forward to the IETF to provide multi-protocol support and provides a better
isolation between the different Address Families transported by an MP-BGP session.
In my proof of concept setup, the “Internet” routing table information is managed by a
BGP-4 daemon using the standard ports, while the local routing information is managed
by a BGP-4 daemon using non-standard ports. Both daemons have independent RIBs
stored in different Linux kernel routing tables. These routing tables have no means of
interaction. PaRArch intentionally does not include any route redistribution mechanism
between the DFZ routing table and the local routing table to avoid cross-pollution.
Additionally, PaRArch does not need to deploy any routing policies in the main
Internet routing table. This implies that the Internet DFZ routing plane would cease to
suffer from negative effects of routing policies on BGP-4 [156, 71] in the case of global
adoption across the whole Internet.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown how introducing some modifications into the current Inter-
net routing architecture introduces better route management and a more robust routing
infrastructure. It has lower resource consumption with regards to routing table manage-
ment and is less prone to routing storms.
In the next and final chapter, I give an outlook on future work on this architecture.
The certain need for IPv6 and the uncertainties that still surround the migration process
open opportunities for this work to be continued and possibly be deployed in the Internet.
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9.1 Conclusions
BGP-4 is the routing protocol between Autonomous Systems in the Internet and at
the same time it is also used for traffic engineering purposes. Traffic engineering is
implemented by means of policies. These policies make BGP-4 yield unintended results.
In my work, I have started by showing that routing policies are used by a majority of
the ASes at the edges of the Internet. I have proposed and implemented an algorithm to
study different phenomena related with traffic engineering. Using this algorithm, I have
looked at situations where the network was oscillating. I could show with BGP-4 traffic
samples that providers try to route “around” oscillations and how they do it. In order
to better understand the behaviour of different providers, I propose to use the empirical
Cumulative Distribution Function of the arrival times of different BGP-4 packets at
the RIPE’s Routing Repository. Then I showed different instances of instability in the
network protocol that can be traced back to ambiguities in the definition of extensions to
the BGP-4 protocol. In this case, I show how a quick fix revealed the internal structure
of an AS Confederation and how a distant AS was affected by a routing storm.
These precedents led me to introduce PaRArch, a new routing architecture for the
Internet that overcomes the problems detected by separating the main routing plane of
the Internet from the local traffic engineering configurations. I have implemented this
architecture on the open-sourced routing daemon Quagga. To test my modified version
of this daemon, I propose use cases where traffic engineering is involved. I demonstrate
that reachibility is never lost and that the routing policies work as intended and compare
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it with current practises using BGP-4 only, where side effects produce routing results
that are not intended. PaRArch is backwards compatible and can be incrementally
deployed and should provide a much stabler Internet. This factor is another advantage
in the current situation, where the migration to IPv6 is in its starting phase and a stable
and reliable IPv4 base network that does not to interfere with the new IPv6 deployments
is needed.
9.2 Using PaRArch in the new IPv6 Internet
One of the current technical challenges for the Internet community is the address space
depletion and success of the migration to IPv6. The RIPE RR has consistent information
regarding the evolution of the IPv6 DFZ and its routing tables only since 2007.
Figure 9.1a shows evolution of the IPv6 routing table size in the Internet’s DFZ, the
number of ASes and the average number of prefixes advertised by one AS. It is worth
noting that this number is greater than 1, which indicates that some ASes are advertising
more than one prefix. Whether these ASes have more than one prefix assigned or this
evolution reveals the first signs of disaggregation in the IPv6 Internet remains to be
studied.
Adopting the proposed architecture at this point in time also has benefits for the
transition to an IPv6-based Internet and during its lifetime. It would allow the reopening
of the problem of AS-level multi-homing in the IPv6 Internet, which is currently closed at
the IETF level and only partially resolved by the RIRs. As far as the IETF is concerned,
RFC 4177 [195] presents the architectural elements of multi-homing in IPv6, concentrates
on site-level multi-homing configurations and favours the hierarchical properties of the
IPv6 addressing allocation procedure over well established and documented Autonomous
System level multi-homing techniques used in today’s IPv4 Internet. Das provides a
broader discussion of multi-homing in IPv6 and notes that one of the major discouraging
facts for reusing the multi-homing techniques of the IPv4 Internet in the IPv6 Internet
is routing table size growth [196]. This argument is understandable in the light of
Figure 7.7.
In 2009, RIPE and other RIRs have opened the door to IPv6 multi-homing by intro-
ducing the PI addressing space in their IPv6 Allocation Policies [197]. While Provider
Independent (PI) addressing space is essential for multi-homed ASes, it imposes impor-
tant restrictions to who can access it, how it is handled and how much space is assigned.
There are, however, no restrictions imposed on advertisement practises. Although it
recommends that fragmentation should be avoided, it does not specifically prohibit it.
The architecture proposed in this paper could be useful in bringing together the TE
needs of multi-homed ASes and a controlled growth of the IPv6 routing table. This
philosophy has been maintained in the last revision of the RIPE IPv6 allocation policy
document [172] in 2011.
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9.3 Future work
In addition to adapting PaRArch to IPv6 scenarios, there are other aspects of this
work that will be continued in the future. The current version of the MRT binary
format parsing tools is prepared for IPv4 and IPv6. However, since the work I have
presented here is more related to IPv4 (e.g., examining the evolution of the routing
tables, examining 4-byte ASN violations and IPv4 prefix update sequences) than to
IPv6, most of the analysis programs rely on the IPv4 routines, which are hence better
tested. IPv6 support needs to be further tested. IPv6 routing table analysis is a task
for the near future and will provide the necessary test cases with real-world data.
Another aspect of Internet dynamics that needs to be more investigated is the char-
acterisation of ISP behaviour with regards to the time slots used to perform routing
infrastructure maintenance in a broader sense. This includes investigating when and
how an ISP modifies the attributes of the prefixes it advertises. This is an important
factor for the possible success of the proposed architecture. An architecture isolating
TE from the Internet will makes sense, whether ISPs limit or not their operation time
window to minimise the impact of TE operations on the Internet. However, by isolating
TE, the pressure to constrain operations to a given time window disappears. In general,
studies comparing the early adoption phases of IPv4 and IPv6 have been recently pub-
lished [133] and the tools I have developed for this work can be also used in the future
to conduct these and related studies.
Another recent evolution of the MRT binary format that needs to be explored
is the possibility to store geo-positioning data of the collecting devices as proposed
in RFC 6397 [198]. Geo-positioning data in conjunction with the time information will
give an extra level of reassurance to the operations time-window detection procedure
described in Section 5.3. Currently, BGP-4 traffic is stored in RIPE’s Routing Repos-
itory are stored using the timestamp of the arrival time. Geo-positioning will allow to
translate these timestamps to the local time of the collecting devices. This will allow
identify the moment of the day – morning, afternoon, etc. – when the events where
actually generated.
Regarding the IPv4 proposal for PaRArch, the main future work is to transfer it to
the industry. In order to do so, some of the concepts will need to go through the IETF
standardisation process. This is a lengthy process that just has been started.
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